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Abstract 
We apply insights from Bayesian analysis in the natural sciences to advance literature on causal 
inference in qualitative case research, building on and critiquing recent treatments of process 
tracing.  Bayesian probability theory provides the uniquely consistent extension of deductive 
logic to situations where information is limited and uncertainty reigns.  Whereas Bayesian 
statistical techniques have been successfully elaborated for quantitative research, applying 
Bayesian probability to qualitative research remains an open frontier.  We provide best-practice 
guidelines for formal (quantified) Bayesian analysis, illustrated with the first systematic 
application to a case-study example.  We envision important roles for formalization in 
pinpointing the locus of contention when scholars disagree on inferences, and in training 
intuition to follow Bayesian probability more systematically, thereby improving inference in 
qualitative research.  However, quantifying qualitative data entails a substantial dose of 
arbitrariness that limits the utility of formally applying Bayesian analysis to complex case 
evidence.  Formal analysis may also prove intractable beyond illustrative examples.  
Nevertheless, Bayesian probability is invaluable for elucidating methodological foundations and 
best practices for process tracing, which has contributed substantially to all realms of political 
science.  Moreover, emphasizing the Bayesian underpinnings of qualitative case research can 
help to bridge between qualitative and quantitative methodological approaches to inference.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Corresponding author. 
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1. Introduction 
A growing movement within political science has identified Bayesianism as the 
methodological foundation of process tracing, which entails making causal inferences within a 
single case by assessing alternative explanations in light of evidence uncovered.1 As part of an 
initiative to improve analytical transparency and establish process tracing as a rigorous method, 
the literature has moved from informal analogies to Bayesianism (McKeown 1999, Bennett 
2008, Beach and Pedersen 2013) toward efforts to formally apply Bayesian analysis in 
qualitative research (Rohlfing 2013, Bennett 2015, Humphreys and Jacobs 2015). We view this 
turn to Bayesianism as a watershed in qualitative methodology that provides solid grounding for 
in-depth, small-N case research. However, whereas Bayesian statistical techniques have been 
successfully elaborated for large-N quantitative research,2 applying Bayesian probability in 
qualitative case research remains a frontier that has not been definitively addressed. Moreover, 
we have identified a number of consequential errors and misunderstandings within the literature 
innovating in this terrain that result from an incomplete understanding of Bayesian probability.    
Our paper—a cross-disciplinary collaboration between a political scientist and a 
physicist—aims to advance literature on Bayesian process tracing by drawing on insights from 
Bayesian probability in the natural sciences.3  Physicists including Cox (1961) and Jaynes (2003) 
have demonstrated mathematically that Bayesian probability theory provides the uniquely 
consistent extension of deductive logic, where all propositions are either true or false, to more 
realistic situations where available information is incomplete, uncertainty reigns, and hypotheses 
can rarely be definitively proven or disproven.  The Bayesian notion of probability—as rational 
degree of belief in hypotheses and other propositions of interest in light what we do in fact 
know—in principle provides a unified framework for inference.     
We begin with a brief introduction to Bayesian probability and its advantages over the 
frequentist alternative (Section 2). We then introduce the fundamental elements of Bayesian 
analysis, with the goal of helping scholars avoid potential pitfalls when endeavoring to formally 
apply Bayesian analysis in case-study research (Section 3). We elaborate guidelines including 
comparing a hypothesis against clearly delineated rivals, rather than its unspecified logical 
negation ~H, and using a logarithmic scale instead of a linear scale to quantify probabilities, with 
an analogy to sound, which is imperative for minimizing arbitrariness and providing meaningful 
measures of uncertainty. Appendix 3, designed as a pedagogical resource, provides the first 
complete and systematic application of formal Bayesian analysis to a qualitative case study and 
showcases our best-practice recommendations.   
Section 4 evaluates whether formal (quantified) Bayesian analysis can improve causal 
inference and analytic transparency in qualitative research. This question is particularly timely 
given debate within political science on how best to promote research transparency (DA-RT 
2013, Lupia and Elman 2014). We envision important roles for formal analysis in pinpointing the 
locus of contention when scholars disagree on case-study inferences and in training intuition to 
follow Bayesian probability more systematically. However, quantification of inherently 
qualitative data involves a substantial dose of arbitrariness that limits the utility of formally 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1Bayesianism also underpins casual analysis in qualitative research much more broadly, including assessing higher-
level theories in light of multiple cases.   
2 E.g. Jaynes (2003), Sivia (2006), Gregory (2005) in natural science; Jackman (2009), Gelman et. al (2013), Gill 
(2008) in social science.  
3 By contrast, much of the current literature relies on less rigorous expositions of Bayesianism in philosophy of 
science.  
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applying Bayesian analysis to complex case evidence. Formal analysis may also be intractable 
for assessing nuanced causal models and impractical beyond illustrative examples.    
These caveats do not undermine the importance of Bayesian probability as the aspirational 
ideal of scientific inference and the methodological foundation for process tracing. 
Understanding the technical details of Bayesian probability that we elaborate can help discipline 
our reasoning and elucidate best practices for process tracing, whether formal or narrative-based.   
Beyond introducing process-tracing practitioners to the fundamentals of Baysesian 
analysis, this paper aims to foster greater understanding of the inferential logic that underlies 
qualitative case research among a broader political science audience.  All research, from large-N 
econometrics to historical analysis, draws on insights from qualitative information, and we 
believe that Bayesian probability can serve as an important bridge between qualitative and 
quantitative methodology.   
 
2. Advantages of Bayesian Probability  
Bayesian inference begins by assigning “prior” probabilities to plausible competing 
hypotheses that represent our degree of confidence in whether each hypothesis is correct, based 
on the inevitably limited information we possess.  We then ask how likely we would be to 
observe some body of evidence if a particular hypothesis were true, and we update our beliefs in 
light of that evidence to derive “posterior” probabilities on our hypotheses.  Bayesian inference 
therefore entails adjusting our degree of belief in each hypothesis based on the evidence 
uncovered.  This approach contrasts with frequentism, which underpins orthodox statistics and 
mainstream correlational approaches to inference in political science. 
Different conceptualizations of probability lie at the heart of the distinction between these 
approaches.  Frequentists understand probabilities as the proportion of some particular outcome 
in a sequence of random trials—for example, the fraction of heads that would appear in a long or 
infinite series of random coin tosses.  In contrast, Bayesians contend that probabilities represent 
rational degrees of belief in logical propositions—e.g. a prediction about the next outcome of a 
coin toss, or a hypothesis regarding bias in the coin—given partial or imperfect information.     
Bayesian probability offers five key advantages.  First, it is much closer to how we think 
about uncertainty in daily life and scientific inquiry.  It allows us to directly ask the question that 
is generally of central interest: How likely is a hypothesis in light of the available evidence?  By 
contrast, frequentistism can only assign probabilities to random variables, not hypotheses.   
Second, Bayesians can assign probabilities to unique events that cannot be embedded in a 
random ensemble of repeated trials.  Bayesianism is therefore well-suited for explaining a single 
case of interest—e.g. Obama’s reelection or the Permian extinction—rather than trying to infer 
properties of, or causal effects in, a larger population.  Bayesians can simply ask: Given certain 
knowledge and assumptions, how likely was it that Obama would win?  By contrast, frequentists 
would treat the actual election as a random draw from some larger set of imagined electoral play-
outs—if the 2012 election could be rerun many times, how often would Obama win?  Clearly we 
cannot rerun the election; even if we can imagine doing so, this is not the right question to ask if 
we want to bring to bear the information we have about the actual outcome.  
Third, Bayesianism allows us to work with a small number of cases, each with variable 
amounts and types of evidence.  Inferences can be drawn from observations whether they are 
quantitative or qualitative, and whether or not they can naturally be considered to arise from a 
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repeatable experiment or stochastic data-generation process.4  Whenever we obtain new 
evidence, Bayesian analysis allows us to update our assessment regarding which explanation is 
most plausible.  By contrast, small-N qualitative research makes little sense within a frequentist 
framework, where only data that can be regarded as a random sample can be analyzed, and large 
samples are often considered critical for accurate inference.  
Fourth, whereas frequentism provides no clear rules for aggregating results from multiple 
tests, Bayesianism facilitates learning from accumulated knowledge.  Bayes’ theorem allows us 
to update probabilities that reflect what we know so far, in light of new evidence, such that our 
probabilities reflect all relevant accumulated knowledge.  Learning in the Bayesian framework 
occurs by virtue of the fact that all probabilities are necessarily conditional probabilities—
confidence in one proposition depends on what else we know and generally changes when we 
make new observations.  
Finally, whereas frequentism calls for data to “speak for themselves,” Bayesian analysis 
entails a “dialogue with the data” (astrophysicist Stephen Gull, quoted in Sivia 2006), which 
mirrors how process tracing is usually conducted.  We build on previous information, ask new 
questions suggested by the data, and draw insights by analyzing the data differently, assessing 
how alternative assumptions alter tentative conclusions, and deciding what kinds of additional 
data should be collected.   
  
3. Operationalizing Bayesian Analysis  
The following sections explain the formalism of Bayesian analysis, with attention to details 
that have been overlooked and suggestions for moving forward in process-tracing research.  
After introducing the basic components of Bayes’ theorem, we elaborate desirable properties of 
the hypothesis set under consideration—exclusivity and completeness.  We discuss challenges 
and recommendations for specifying priors, articulating background information, conditioning 
on previously-incorporated evidence, and quantifying probabilities.  We explain why explicitly 
elaborating rival hypotheses instead of comparing H directly against ~H is critical for inference.  
Finally, we emphasize that the formalism of Bayesian process tracing is simple and 
straightforward; the fundamentals neither require nor permit modifications. 
Looking forward, we stress that assessing what Bayesian analysis can do for process 
tracing as well as the limitations requires an understanding of the technical aspects discussed 
below.  Many of these aspects also have implications for informal narrative-based process 
tracing, which will be highlighted in Section 4.3. 
  
3.1 Bayes’ Theorem 
Bayesian analysis allows us to update our assessment of the probability that a hypothesis 
Hk is correct, in light of the evidence E as well as any relevant background information I we 
possess.  Bayes’ theorem is simply a rearrangement of the product rule of probability: 
 𝑃 𝐻! 𝐸  𝐼 = 𝑃 𝐻!   𝐼)  𝑃(𝐸|𝐻!   𝐼)𝑃 𝐸|  𝐼     ,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                (1) 
 
where P(Hk |E I ) is the posterior probability of hypothesis Hk—the conditional probability of the 
hypothesis given the evidence E and the background information I; P(Hk | I ) is the prior 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Even in much large-N research, “We typically get a dataset that is situational in time and circumstance and will 
never be replicated,” (Gill and Witko 2005:459). 
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probability of hypothesis Hk—the degree of belief in the hypothesis conditioned on the 
background information but without incorporating the additional evidence E; P(E |Hk I ) is the 
likelihood—the conditional probability of the evidence given the hypothesis and the background 
information; and P(E | I ) is the total probability of the evidence, conditioned on the background 
information, but regardless of whether Hk holds.  Bayes’ theorem tells us that the posterior 
probability (the degree of belief in a hypothesis given the evidence) is proportional to the prior 
probability (how likely the hypothesis was before the evidence was considered) and to the 
likelihood (how likely the evidence would be if the hypothesis were known to be true), 
normalized by the total probability of the evidence.  
We usually want to compare hypotheses, so we can work with relative rather than absolute 
degrees of belief.  Applying Bayes’ theorem (1) to two different hypotheses and taking the ratio 
gives the posterior odds ratio:     𝑃 𝐻! 𝐸  𝐼𝑃 𝐻! 𝐸  𝐼 = 𝑃 𝐻!   𝐼)𝑃 𝐻!|  𝐼 ×   𝑃 𝐸 𝐻!   𝐼𝑃 𝐸 𝐻!   𝐼     ,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      (2)	  
 
where P(Hk | I ) ⁄ P(Hl | I ) is the prior odds ratio, and the factor P(E |Hk I ) ⁄ P(E |Hl I ) is the 
likelihood ratio—the relative probability of observing evidence E under the different hypotheses.      
Another useful formulation of Bayes’ theorem is: 𝑃 𝐻! 𝐸  𝐼) = 𝑃 𝐻!   𝐼)  𝑃(𝐸|𝐻!   𝐼)  ∑𝑃 𝐻!|  𝐼 𝑃(𝐸|𝐻!  𝐼)     ,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        (3)	  
 
where we have introduced the sum over a set of hypotheses {Hn : n =1...N} which we assume as 
part of our background information to be mutually exclusive and exhaustive (Section 3.2).  
Equations (2) and (3) make Bayes’ theorem easier to use by eliminating P(E | I), which is often 
difficult to assess without decomposing into a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
hypotheses (Section 3.7).   
  
3.2 Specifying Mutually Exhaustive and Exclusive Hypotheses  
Introducing a set of mutually exhaustive and exclusive (MEE) hypotheses is not always 
necessary; if we only wish to compare the relative probabilities of hypotheses, we can work 
directly with Bayes rule in form (2).  However, working with MEE hypotheses is usually 
preferable, especially if we wish to calculate posterior probabilities.  In practice, it is almost 
impossible to calculate or interpret probabilities if the hypotheses are not regarded as mutually 
exclusive and conditionally exhaustive given the background information.  
Elaborating a complete (mutually exhaustive) set of hypotheses is infeasible, because the 
possibilities are infinite.  However, Bayesian analysis entails inference to best explanation.  In 
practice, we need not explicitly include hypotheses that we deem highly implausible—for 
example, HX = the Mayan civilization was destroyed by aliens.  While this hypothesis is not 
strictly impossible, our prior would be so low that we would not include it in {Hk}.  Discovering 
astonishing evidence might motivate us to reconsider, in which case we would go back and 
include HX  in {Hk} and redo our analysis.5  Furthermore, Bayesian analysis entails inference to 
the best available explanation.  Our hypothesis set may be limited by the state of the field and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See also Jaynes (2003:103-04).  Note that exceptional claims need exceptional proof; evidence must be carefully 
validated, because there is always another alternative (a mistake in the experiment). 
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the confines of our imagination.  In practice, this is unproblematic because the assumption that 
our hypotheses are mutually exhaustive is included in the background information,6 and all 
inferences are conditioned on this assumption, which ensures that our reasoning is internally 
consistent.  If a new explanation arises, we must again redo our analysis including the new 
hypothesis in {Hk}.  This process has occurred throughout the history of science.   
Ensuring that hypotheses are mutually exclusive can be a more difficult task that requires 
care.  For many natural science applications, this process is straightforward; for example, a 
researcher might seek to ascertain whether a parameter lies within a given range (Ha) or outside 
of that range (Hb).  In social sciences, however, we usually deal with more complex hypothesis 
spaces, and alternative explanations may not be mutually exclusive.  Consider Stokes’ (2001) 
research on neoliberalism by surprise in Latin America.  She assesses two hypotheses: Ha = 
presidents violated protectionist policy mandates in order to represent voters’ best interests;  
Hb = presidents violated those mandates in order to seek rents associated with neoliberal reforms 
(e.g. privatization).  However, we could entertain the possibility that both factors motivated 
decisions to enact neoliberal reforms.  We might delineate five rivals: H1 = primarily 
representation, H2 = both but mostly representation, H3 = both in relatively equal measure,  
H4 = both but mostly rent-seeking, H5 = primarily rent-seeking.  Strictly speaking, however, 
ensuring that these possibilities are mutually exclusive entails greater precision—what exactly do 
we mean by “primarily” vs. “mostly” vs. “relatively equal”?  This specification issue is one of 
many challenges when formalizing Bayesian process tracing.  Additional complications arise if 
we wish to model how representation and rent-seeking contribute in H2–4.  These two factors 
might act independently.  Or they might interact; perhaps representation serves as a means to the 
end of long-term rent-seeking through continuity in office given sustained opportunities for 
corruption embedded in neoliberalism.  In practice, it is important to specify hypotheses as 
carefully as possible and to explicitly acknowledge the assumption that they are mutually 
exclusive as part of the background information.  If evidence is uncovered suggesting a more 
complex hypothesis would provide the best explanation, we should incorporate it in {Hk} and 
redo the analysis. 
 
3.3 Priors     
The problem of how to assign priors remains an open question in Bayesian analysis.  Two 
polar positions exist in the literature, associated with what we call subjective vs. objective 
Bayesianism.7  Subjective Bayesians view priors as a matter of opinion and see no contradiction 
if two observers who possess identical background information espouse different priors.  
Objective Bayesians view priors as uniquely representing a given state of knowledge, such that 
two rational analysts with identical background information should necessarily assign the same 
priors. 
In principle, we advocate an objective Bayesian approach, starting from near-ignorance.8  
To approximate priors consistent with the background information I, we can start in a “pre-prior” 
state I0 of maximal ignorance consistent with only the most basic knowledge about the problem 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 One role of I is precisely to limit the space of possibilities under consideration. 
7 Our terminology follows Jaynes (2003) and Sivia (2006), who are objectivists.  Subjectivists include Howson and 
Urbach (2006:296-97) and Jeffrey (1893).  Contrary to our usage, Bayesianism writ large is sometimes described as 
“subjective” and frequentism as “objective” (since probabilities are considered properties of ensembles) (Jackman 
2009).  
8 Objective Bayesianism does not require starting from ignorance.  
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in question.  We then build up via Bayes’ theorem to the actual prior state of knowledge I, which 
includes all prior evidence not already in I0, before incorporating newly-acquired evidence E.  
We can incorporate the additional prior information piece by piece, where at each step, the 
posterior serves as the prior for analyzing the next piece of evidence.   
When considering a discrete set of mutually-exclusive hypotheses, we begin by placing 
equal prior probabilities on each, because we have no reason to prefer one over another in our 
pre-prior state of ignorance I0.  This reasoning corresponds to the “principle of indifference” or 
“insufficient reason,” (Gregory 2005:37-38; Jaynes 2003:40-41).  Starting from these 
“indifference priors,” we then seek to systematically incorporate all relevant additional 
background information using Bayes’ theorem as explained above.    
Before assigning indifference priors, we must think carefully about our hypothesis space.  
Suppose we wish to ascertain the probability that the next person we meet will have red hair.  
Assigning 50% prior probabilities to the following mutually-exclusive hypotheses would not 
make sense: HR = red hair; ~HR = not red hair.  These two hypotheses do not reflect rudimentary 
background information relevant to the problem—we know that there are roughly six basic hair-
color types.  The natural set of hypotheses for the problem is therefore something like: HR = red, 
HBr = brown, HBk = black, HBl = blonde, HG = grey, HW = white, and from a position of ignorance 
but for this basic information about hair-color types—e.g. setting aside our experience of how 
many people we know with various hair colors—we would assign equal prior probabilities of 
1/6.  The course-grained nature of ~HR compared to HR  precludes application of the indifference 
principle until we specify the alternatives contained within ~HR.  In social science, it is especially 
important to think carefully about the hypothesis space before using the indifference principle to 
assign equal priors; simply stating 50% for H and 50% for ~H is usually problematic.9  
In practice, objective Bayesianism is aspirational.  In many real-world cases, there is no 
unique definition of maximal ignorance or any clear prescription for translating background 
information into priors (Jaynes 2003:343-96).  In the physical sciences, indifference priors or 
generalizations thereof (e.g. via maximum entropy) are only justified when the hypothesis space 
has underlying symmetries.  Even if we can justify beginning from indifference, it may be 
impossible to systematically apply Bayes theorem to the sum total of our background knowledge 
in order to update from I0 to I.   
Despite these problems, the ambiguities of assigning priors do not preclude Bayesian 
analysis.  In the natural sciences, scholars employ approximations and/or carry out Bayesian 
sensitivity analysis—checking to what extent conclusions depend on the choice of priors.  
Moreover, scholars can report likelihood ratios instead of posterior probabilities and allow 
readers to apply their own priors.  If the probative value of the evidence is strong, scholars can 
converge on a single hypothesis even if they start from different priors.  Such convergence may 
not be possible if the evidence does not strongly favor a single hypothesis; however, analysts can 
at least agree on the direction in which their credence should be shifted. 
Process tracing could adopt a similar approach where scholars focus on assessing 
likelihood ratios but also compare posterior probabilities derived using different priors—for 
example, equal prior probabilities on each hypothesis vs. subjective prior probabilities that aim 
to be as consistent as possible with the background information.10  We must acknowledge, 
however, that likelihoods for inherently qualitative evidence will be highly subjective.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 A vast literature critiques Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason, but most criticism fails to recognize that 
asymmetry between H and ~H precludes its application. 
10 See Gill (2008:159-75) on eliciting priors from experts. 
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Therefore, focusing on likelihoods is not a guaranteed prescription for eliminating disagreements 
regarding how to evaluate the evidence and how to adjust relative degrees of credence in rival 
hypotheses, and convergence on a single preferred hypothesis may prove elusive.  
Despite inevitable challenges, the guidelines outlined above may help scholars assign 
priors more consistently.  Authors experimenting with quantification for formal Bayesian 
analysis have often assigned priors in ad-hoc ways.  Consider Bennett’s (2015) discussion of 
Tannenwald’s (2007) research on the non-use of nuclear weapons in the postwar period.  He 
focuses on Tannenwald’s three principle alternative hypotheses, which we denote HD = 
deterrence, HM = lack of military utility, and HT = norms, in the form of a “nuclear taboo.”  
Bennett (2015:277) observes that these hypotheses “at first glance seem equally plausible.”  In 
accord with this assessment, which corresponds to the indifference principle, we should use 
equal prior probabilities of 1/3 for each hypothesis.  However, Bennett (2015:278) instead 
chooses an unmotivated prior of 40% for HT and 60% for ~HT (=HD+HM).  Rohlfling (2013:13-
16) in contrast produces priors through a process that entails identifying a working hypothesis, 
assigning a preliminary prior probability of 50%, discovering a different hypotheses from 
exploring the literature, and then reducing the prior probability on the working hypothesis by an 
arbitrary amount.  After two iterations corresponding to the discovery of two alternative 
hypotheses, he produces a prior for the working hypothesis of 30%.  From a more objective 
Bayesian approach, if we are comparing three hypotheses assumed to be MEE, we recommend 
assigning each a prior probability of 1/3 according to the indifference principle.  Alternatively, 
we should state each hypothesis from the outset and then assign subjective priors with an 
explanation of why we favor some hypotheses in light of our background knowledge. 
Reiterating the critical points, before assigning priors, we must elaborate a mutually-
exclusive and clearly articulated set of hypotheses that are assumed to be complete.  If we wish 
to assign indifference priors rather than subjective priors, we must be sure the hypothesis set is 
natural to the problem, in that our preliminary information provides no reason to prefer one 
hypothesis over another.  Whether we use indifference or subjective priors, we should assign a 
probability to each mutually exclusive hypothesis, rather than considering only the working 
hypothesis and its logical negation, which implicitly contains all of the rivals.  If we discover or 
devise a new hypothesis later on, we must start the problem over and reassign priors.   
 
3.4 Background Information 
In each probability appearing in Bayes’ theorem, we explicitly condition on the background 
information I.  Despite growing interest in harnessing prior knowledge for inference (Kreuzer 
2010, Collier 2011:824), literature on Bayesian process tracing has neglected I.  Authors have 
observed that findings from existing literature shape priors and that context shapes how we 
interpret observations (Beach and Pedersen 2013:126, Bennett and Checkel 2015:25).  However, 
the background information has not been systematically treated in mathematical expositions or 
empirical applications, especially with regard to likelihoods.  This problem is not unique to 
political science.  Bayesians across disciplines are often sloppy about designating and keeping 
track of the background information,11 a practice that can lead to many misunderstandings.12   
Strictly speaking, I includes all prior evidence from existing literature relevant to the 
question at hand.  For qualitative case research I also includes a large body of facts about a 
particular country and its political system, as well as knowledge about effort expended to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Howson and Urbach (2007) for example do not explicitly denote the background information.  
12 Identifying assumptions implicitly contained in the background information resolves many paradoxes in statistics.   
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uncover particular types of evidence, trust in informants, assessments of the sources’ authority 
on the topic, and a wide range of contextual clues that inform interpretation of evidence.  
Appendix 3 gives examples of how particular elements of I inform likelihood assessments.   
In practice, it is impossible to fully articulate the background information, especially in the 
complex world of social science.  Even the most assiduous analyst attempting to catalog relevant 
background information will find that there is always some additional detail that s/he has used 
unthinkingly or automatically.  If we conduct the analysis in ever more fine-grained detail, 
breaking the evidence into smaller and smaller pieces, we may become aware of more elements 
of I that we had used implicitly.  Moreover, we can always think more deeply about I and 
identify additional elements that we did not use explicitly but that might lead to more refined 
inferences.  Judgment must guide decisions on when to stop this potentially endless process.    
  
3.5 Conditioning on Previously-Incorporated Evidence 
In most problems, we compare hypotheses in light of a body of evidence E consisting of 
multiple observations, E1–EN.  We can incorporate these observations one by one using Bayes’ 
theorem to calculate a final posterior probability for each hypothesis by decomposing P(E|Hk I) 
as follows:   𝑃 𝐸 𝐻!   𝐼 = 𝑃 𝐸1𝐸2…𝐸! 𝐻!   𝐼 = 𝑃 𝐸! 𝐸1𝐸2…𝐸(N-­‐1)  𝐻!   𝐼   𝑃 𝐸1𝐸2…𝐸(N-­‐1)|𝐻!   𝐼 = ⋯ = 𝑃 𝐸! 𝐸1…𝐸(N-­‐1)  𝐻!   𝐼   𝑃 𝐸(N-­‐1) 𝐸1…𝐸(N-­‐2)  𝐻!   𝐼 …𝑃 𝐸1   𝐻!   𝐼     ,                                                                              (4) 
 
because we can always write the joint probability of  A and B as the probability of A conditional 
on B times the probability of B: P(AB) = P(A|B)*P(B).  For any piece of evidence, the likelihood 
must therefore be assessed conditional not only on a hypothesis and the background information, 
but also on all evidence from the current problem that we have previously incorporated, Eprev. In 
other words, we must ask if we are any more or less likely to observe a particular Ex given that 
we already know Eprev, beyond what the hypothesis and I imply. 
Bennett and Checkel (2015:27-28) indirectly address conditioning on previously-
incorporated evidence in recommending that scholars “seek diverse and independent streams of 
evidence” and end data collection when additional evidence becomes highly repetitive and hence 
does not contribute to further updating.  If two pieces of evidence E1 and E2 are completely 
dependent under Hk, then the presence of one implies the other, such that P(E2 |E1 Hk I) =1, and 
observing E2 given that we already know E1 does not affect the posterior probability on Hk (from 
equations (1) and (4)).      
However, conditioning on previously-incorporated evidence has not been treated carefully 
in formal expositions, partly because scholars have not attempted to aggregate inferences from 
multiple observations.  In general, and especially in qualitative case research that draws on 
extensive evidence, observations may be interdependent in highly complex ways.    
When conditioning on previous evidence, what matters is logical dependence between Ex 
and Eprev under a given hypothesis.  Logical dependence may arise from causal dependence, but 
Eprev need not exert any causal effect on Ex.  Suppose an informant interviewed in December 
2005 tells a story X: evidence EInf(X), and a news article from May 2005 contains a similar story: 
evidence ENews(X).13  Suppose we observe EInf(X) first.  Even though EInf(X) cannot have a causal 
effect on ENews(X) given the temporal sequencing, P(ENews(X) |EInf(X) H I) will not be the same as 
P(ENews(X) |H I).  Whether P(ENews(X) |EInf(X) H I) will be higher or lower than P(ENews(X) |H I) may 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13See E1ʹ′ and E5ʹ′, Appendix 3.  
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depend on the hypothesis.  The point is that EInf(X) and ENews(X) are logically dependent given 
possible causal connections that might have occurred in the past.  For instance, the informant 
may have learned X from reading the article, so under many hypotheses, we would be less 
surprised to encounter the article after talking to the informant.  
Logical dependence can even exist in the absence of direct causal links.  Consider a 
sequence of two independent coin flips that both produce tails (E1=E2=T).  If we know the coin is 
weighted but we lack information about the bias (H1), then E1 and E2 are logically dependent, 
and P(E1|H1 E2) should be higher than P(E1|H1).  Knowing that the second toss produced tails 
gives additional information about the likelihood of getting tails on the first toss under the 
assumption that the coin is weighted, despite the fact that the second toss exerts no causal 
influence on the first toss.  Likewise, since we assume throws are independent, E1 exerts no 
causal influence on E2, but because of the logical dependence, P(E2|H1 E1) > P(E2|H1).   
In some cases, evidence can be dependent under a wide range of hypotheses.  For example, 
we would expect close colleagues from the same political party to tell similar stories, because 
their views have been mutually shaped through repeated interaction and discussion, and they 
likely share similar instrumental motives.  Regardless of whether the probability of observing 
this evidence under a particular hypothesis is high or low, we expect some positive correlation 
between the two accounts.    
In general, however, evidence may be dependent under some hypotheses but not others.  
Revisiting the coin-flip example with E1=E2=T, and H1 = weighted coin with bias unknown, we 
know that E2 and E1 are logically dependent as discussed above, and P(E2|H1 E1) > P(E2|H1).  But 
if H2 = coin weighted in favor of tails by 75%, then E1 and E2 are independent, and  
P(E2|H2 E1) = P(E2|H2).  Since we know the coin’s bias, observing tails on the first toss does not 
affect the likelihood of tails on the second toss—both would be 75%.  
Because dependencies in the data may change under different hypotheses, we cannot 
necessarily conclude that a piece of evidence E2 that is dependent on E1 under a given hypothesis 
will necessarily be less probative once E1 is known (Bennett 2015:292).  The probative value of 
the evidence—whether we should adjust our views in favor of one hypothesis over another—
derives from the likelihood ratio, P(E2|Hj E1) ⁄ P(E2|Hk E1), and E1 and E2 may be more dependent 
or less dependent under Hj compared to Hk.    
This discussion highlights another important point: invoking “independent sources of 
evidence,” which is common in the literature,14 carries no meaning without further qualification.  
Independence is not an objective physical property of sources, it is a logical relationship between 
pieces of evidence given certain hypotheses.  For any two pieces of evidence—which if properly 
stated should include information about the source—it is almost always possible to concoct some 
hypothesis under which they are dependent.  Drawing on distinct sources or types of information 
is generally advisable, but it does not absolve us from thinking carefully about potential logical 
dependence among the data.  The degree to which one source corroborates another depends on 
the hypothesis under consideration.     
The rules of conditional probability imply that the order in which we incorporate evidence 
into the analysis does not affect our final results.  The joint likelihood of observing two pieces of 
evidence can be written in any of the following equivalent ways: P(EA EB|H I) =P(EB EA|H I) = 
P(EA|EB H I) P(EB|H I) =P(EB|EA H I) P(EA|H I), using the product rule of probability.  Some 
literature in the subjective Bayesian tradition that applies non-standard conditionalization or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 E.g. Beach and Pedersen (2013:128), Bennett and Checkel (2015:27-28), Rohlfing (2012:170-71).  
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updating rules maintains that the order of incorporation does matter,15 but we view that approach 
as misguided and that conclusion as contrary to the laws of probability.   
Because we are free to incorporate evidence in any order, we can look for sequences that 
facilitate conditioning on previous evidence when assessing likelihoods.  Incorporating strongly 
discriminating evidence last could preclude having to condition other pieces of evidence on the 
conjunction of a hypothesis and an observation that is extremely implausible under that 
hypothesis, which is a difficult mental exercise.  Incorporating highly-decisive evidence last 
could also obviate careful conditioning on previous evidence, because the likelihood ratios will 
be extremely large regardless.  (Of course, if the evidence is decisive enough, we could 
incorporate it first and be done; further evidence will contribute only marginally to our 
posteriors.)  Nevertheless, conditioning on previous evidence is difficult in practice, regardless of 
how observations are sequenced (Appendix 3).   
 
3.6 Logarithmic Scales for Probabilities  
When quantifying probabilities in process tracing, authors have used essentially linear, 
often course-grained scales.  For example, Rohlfing (2013:19) states: “the prior of the working 
hypothesis can take values ranging from 0.1 to 0.9” and works with increments of 0.2.  
Humphreys and Jacobs (2015:76-80) label 0.1 “very unlikely,” 0.3 “low-moderate,” and 0.9  
“high.”  Beach and Pedersen (2014:12) propose the following informal associations: very certain 
(70-95%), somewhat certain (50-69%), somewhat uncertain (30-49%), and uncertain (10-29%).  
Such approaches are problematic. Use of a linear scale fosters arbitrary quantification and 
precludes effective use of the full dynamic range of probabilities, in particular, values near zero 
or one.  The difference between 25% and 95% may seem large to a casual observer, yet the 
probabilities we encounter in our daily lives easily vary by orders of magnitude. 
Instead, we advocate a logarithmic scale for odds ratios and likelihood ratios, which is 
common practice in both the natural sciences and the information sciences.  This approach leads 
to gradations that are better aligned with intuition and allows for more meaningful description of 
very likely or very unlikely events and propositions.  Using a logarithmic scale, in conjunction 
with our analogy to sound, promotes consistency when working with qualitative information and 
facilitates intersubjective agreement on probabilities.    
Our recommendation is grounded in psychophysics, which shows that sensory perception 
tends to be a logarithmic function of the strength of the stimulus. Stated in differential terms, a 
just-noticeable difference in the loudness of sound, brightness of light, or pressure on the skin is 
proportional to the magnitude of the stimulus.  Barely-noticeable differences correspond to 
relative changes, not absolute changes.  While this relationship—the Weber-Fechner Law—is an 
approximate phenomenological regularity rather than a law of nature, it works well for a wide 
variety of stimuli and over a large range of magnitudes. This relationship is sensible given that 
humans experience stimuli of highly varied intrinsic intensity—by building in a logarithmic 
scale, evolution has increased the dynamic range of our nervous system, allowing us to better 
discern and discriminate a greater scope and variety of sensory input. Given this characteristic 
feature of our nervous systems, a logarithmic scale is more natural than a linear scale for 
measuring and analyzing sensory inputs. Sound, for example, is measured in decibels, defined 
such that increasing the intensity of the sound wave by a factor of ten corresponds to an additive 
increment of ten decibels; increasing the intensity by a factor of 100 corresponds to 20 decibels.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See Van Fraassen (1989) on Jeffrey conditionalization.  
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For similar reasons, logarithmic scales are used to assess perceptions of uncertainty in 
probabilistic inference.  Good’s (1985) weight of evidence in favor of one hypothesis compared 
to a rival, measured in decibels, is proportional to the logarithm of the likelihood ratio: 𝑊!" = 10 log!" 𝑃(𝐸|𝐻!   𝐼)𝑃(𝐸|𝐻!   𝐼)     ,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  (5) 
In more familiar terms, the weight of evidence describes the probative value of the evidence—
how strongly it discriminates between two rival hypotheses. This formulation offers the 
computational advantage that we can add weights of evidence when analyzing multiples pieces 
of information.  It is also convenient to work with the logarithm of the posterior odds ratio: 10 log!" 𝑃 𝐻! 𝐸  𝐼𝑃 𝐻! 𝐸  𝐼 = 10 log!" 𝑃 𝐻! 𝐼𝑃 𝐻! 𝐼 + 10 log!" 𝑃 𝐸 𝐻!   𝐼𝑃 𝐸 𝐻!   𝐼     ,                                                                                                              (6) 
following directly from equation (2). Working with logarithms thus gives a particularly simple 
form of Bayes’ rule: the posterior log-odds equals the prior log-odds plus the weight of evidence.  
Good (1985) contends that a change in weight of evidence of around one decibel, for 
example from even odds (1:1) to odds of around 5:4, is as fine-grained as humans can reliably 
quantify their degree of belief in competing hypotheses. A change in probability from 75% to 
90% corresponds to an increase in log-odds of about 5 decibels, which is salient, but in the 
natural sciences, cogent evidence might regularly lead to swings of several tens of decibels, 
corresponding to orders of magnitude increase in the odds ratio. Notice that in Bennett’s 
(2015:281) illustration of a smoking-gun test, where P(E|H) =0.2 and P(E|~H) =0.05, the weight 
of evidence is only 6 decibels—salient, but not decisive enough by Good’s standards to serve as 
a smoking gun for H.      
Measuring log-odds in decibels allows us to leverage our everyday experience with sound, 
while providing a quantitative underpinning for Gull’s metaphor of Bayesian inference as a 
dialogue with the data—in essence we can ask whether the evidence is whispering or shouting in 
favor of a particular hypothesis.  In acoustics, the minimal noticeable change in ambient 
environments is roughly 3 decibels.  A change of 5 decibels is clearly noticeable, while an 
increase of 10 decibels is perceived as about twice as loud; 20 decibels is roughly four times 
louder.  Table 1 provides typical reference sounds in decibels.  For example, a quiet bedroom 
averages 30 decibels, while an ordinary conversation is about 60 decibels.   
When formalizing qualitative research, we suggest regarding decisive evidence that 
strongly favors one hypothesis over a rival as roughly equivalent to 30 decibels, which 
corresponds to the difference between a quiet bedroom and a conversation—in other words, the 
data are “talking clearly.”  Likewise, a very low prior log-odds against a hypothesis relative to a 
more plausible rival could reasonably be set at –50 decibels (Jaynes 2003:99-100), the difference 
between a pin drop and a conversation.    
In closing, we might remind readers who remain skeptical of working with decibels that 
use of a logarithmic scale for measuring odds ratios was a key insight that allowed Alan Turing 
to decode the German Enigma cypher, helping to secure an Allied victory in World War II.   
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Table 1: Typical Sound Levels (dB)† 
 
10 Adult hearing threshold; rustling leaves, pin-drop  
20-25 Whisper  
30 Quiet bedroom or library, ticking watch 
45 Sufficient to wake a sleeping person  
50 Moderate rainstorm   
60 Typical conversation   
70 Noisy restaurant, common TV level  
80 Busy curbside, alarm clock   
90 Passing diesel truck or motorcycle     
100 Dance club, construction cite  
115 Rock concert, baby screaming   
 
†Reference scales vary across sources.  See for example: www.osha.gov/dts/osta/otm/new_noise/ 
 
 
3.7 Specifying ~H 
Most frequentist hypothesis testing entails rejecting or not rejecting a single, “null” 
hypothesis based on some measure of how unlikely the evidence would be if the hypothesis were 
true. But from a Bayesian perspective, hypotheses cannot be assessed in isolation; we must 
compare competing hypotheses. Verifying that observed evidence is consistent with a given 
hypothesis is not sufficient to confirm it, since many other rivals might account for the evidence 
equally well. Likewise, uncovering evidence whose likelihood is small under the hypothesis does 
not necessarily cast doubt on it, because the evidence might be even more improbable under the 
most plausible alternatives. To boost our credence in a hypothesis, our overall body of evidence 
must favor this hypothesis over its rivals.     
Despite the importance of comparing hypotheses, discussions of Bayesian process tracing 
assess a single working hypothesis H against its logical negation, ~H.  Authors commonly 
employ Bayes’ rule in the form: 
 𝑃 𝐻 𝐸  𝐼 = 𝑃 𝐻 𝐼)  𝑃(𝐸|𝐻  𝐼)𝑃 𝐻 𝐼   𝑃 𝐸|𝐻  𝐼 + 𝑃 ~𝐻 𝐼   𝑃(𝐸|~𝐻  𝐼)     ,                                                                                                                                                                      (7) 
 
(we explicitly include I as a best practice). Scholars then attempt to reason about the likelihood 
of observing E if H is correct, P(E|H I), and if H is incorrect, P(E|~H I).   
When working with complex hypothesis spaces, assessing likelihoods under ~H without 
clearly specifying what ~H entails is problematic. H could fail to hold in an infinite number of 
ways; on its own, ~H is not a well-defined proposition. As part of our background information, 
we must state which possibilities we want to evaluate, so that we have a well-defined set {H, 
Halt_1 ... Halt_N }. Even after we have defined our hypothesis set, attempting to directly intuit 
P(E|~H I) is neither straightforward nor necessary.  Instead we should work with probabilities 
conditioned on rival hypotheses, P(E|Halt_i I), each of which may have a different value.  
Consider an astronomical example (Jaynes 2003). After discovering Uranus, scientists 
noticed that its path deviated from the prediction of Newtonian mechanics given the positions of 
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the other astronomical bodies known at the time. The deviation could be reconciled by the 
presence of an as-yet undiscovered planet exerting a gravitation pull on Uranus. Neptune was 
subsequently found close to but not exactly at the predicted position. What does this discovery 
tell us about Newton’s theory (HN)? Jaynes (2003:135) emphasizes that we cannot assess the 
proposition that HN is correct against the proposition that it is incorrect, ~HN, because “the 
statement ‘Newton’s theory is false’ has no definite implications until we specify what 
alternative we have to put in place of Newton’s theory.” If the only alternative theory available at 
the time implied that no planets could exist beyond Uranus, then the likelihood of the evidence 
(Neptune’s measured location) under ~HN would be zero, and the discovery of Neptune would 
confirm HN, even though Neptune’s position was slightly off of the prediction. However, if the 
alternative theory is general relativity, the likelihood of the evidence under ~HN is the same as 
the likelihood under HN, since Einstein’s and Newton’s predictions do not differ detectibly in the 
case at hand, and we would have no cause to update our beliefs. The lesson is that:  
Unless the observed facts are absolutely impossible on hypothesis H0, it is 
meaningless to ask how much those facts tend ‘in themselves’ to confirm or 
refute H0. ...we have not asked any definite, well-posed question until we 
specify the possible alternative to H0.  Then... probability theory can tell us 
how our hypothesis fares relative to the alternatives we have specified. 
(Jaynes 2003:136)  
Returning to political science, Bennett’s (2015) discussion of Tannenwald (2007) illustrates 
the potential problems of comparing H directly against ~H.  As discussed previously, Bennett 
places a prior of 0.4 on Tannenwald’s taboo hypothesis, HT, regarding the non-use of nuclear 
weapons, and 0.6 on ~HT.  Bennett (2015:279) then considers evidence E: “normative constraints 
were discussed” by decision-makers.  Bennett reasons that P(E|HT) will be high and assigns a 
value of 0.9, conditional on the assumption that “we have access to evidence on the decision 
meetings.”  In contrast, Bennett (2015:280) sets P(E|~HT) = 0.7, reasoning that decision-makers 
may have strategic reasons to publicly appeal to norms even if they reject use of nuclear weapons 
for other reasons: “A leader might cite his or her ‘principled’ restraint in not using nuclear 
weapons ...when in fact he or she was deterred by the threat of retaliation.  Also, leaders might 
discuss normative constraints, but not make them the deciding factor if the military utility of 
nuclear weapons is in doubt.”  Bennett thus calculates P(~HT) P(E|~HT) =0.6 × 0.7 =0.42, and 
P(HT) P(E|HT) =0.4 × 0.9 =0.36.  Applying equation (5), he derives a posterior P(HT|E ) =0.46, 
slightly higher than his prior for the taboo hypothesis. 
However, if we proceed more carefully by conditioning on a single alternative hypothesis 
at a time, we may arrive at a different posterior on the taboo hypothesis. Recall that Tannenwald 
specifies two main alternatives: HD = deterrence, and HM = military non-utility. We think the 
likelihood P(E|HM) should be lower than the likelihood P(E|HD).  Whereas leaders may have 
instrumental reasons to display principled restraint rather than publicly admitting fear of 
retaliation and appearing weak relative to the enemy, we anticipate fewer incentives for leaders 
to make a show of principled restraint if they simply judge nuclear weapons to be militarily 
ineffective.16 We might therefore take P(E|HM) =0.3 and P(E|HD ) =0.7 (retaining Bennett’s linear 
probability scale to facilitate comparison). Taking Bennett’s prior of 0.4 on HT and his likelihood 
P(E|HT) =0.9, applying equal priors of 0.3 on HD and HM for lack of any better rationale, and 
substituting into Bayes theorem with each rival hypothesis specified in the denominator:     	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 We are hardly experts, and I (suppressed in equations above following Bennett’s exposition) will play an 
important role in reasoning about these likelihoods.   
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 𝑃 𝐻! 𝐸 = 𝑃(𝐻!)  𝑃(𝐸|𝐻!)𝑃(𝐻!)  𝑃 𝐸|𝐻! + 𝑃(𝐻!)  𝑃 𝐸 𝐻! + 𝑃(𝐻!)  𝑃(𝐸|𝐻!)     ,                                                                                                                  (8) 
 
we calculate P(HT|E) =0.54, which is higher than Bennett’s posterior of 0.46.   
In sum, we must explicitly elaborate a set of mutually-exclusive alternatives to H in order 
to reason meaningfully about likelihoods if H does not hold.  If there is more than one reasonable 
alternative hypothesis, this approach is especially critical.   
 
3.8 Focusing on the Fundamentals   
If we simply wish to assess explanations, formal Bayesian process tracing requires 
specifying nothing more than priors and likelihoods. Additional complications found in the 
literature—ad-hoc probability rules, extensive parameterizations, or classifications of evidence 
and test types—are at best unnecessary.    
Several scholars introduce additional probabilities that we view as incorrect extensions of 
Bayesian logic.  Beach and Pedersen (2013:126-29) propose assessing the probability that the 
“evidence” is “accurate” as an additional, distinct component of Bayesian analysis.  In their 
approach, if a source provides information X, then X is considered to be the evidence.  Instead, 
we advocate directly evaluating the likelihood that a particular source would make statement X, 
given the specific hypothesis under consideration and the background information, which 
includes assessments of the source’s reliability and other relevant contextual information.  This 
approach—defining E as “source S says X”—is not only simpler, it is also analytically 
imperative, because in general the accuracy of information X depends on the hypothesis under 
consideration (Appendix 1).  Kreuzer and DeFina (2015) propose the notion of “evidentiary fit” 
to assess how well a piece of evidence matches a theoretical prediction; they use this new 
probability as a “discount factor” applied to the likelihood.  However, the likelihood, if correctly 
specified and evaluated, is precisely what tells us how well the evidence fits with the hypothesis, 
and likelihood ratios indicate how much the evidence discriminates between different 
hypotheses.  The tendency to create ad hoc rules is widespread in subjective Bayesian probability 
literature; however, Cox’s axioms imply that any proposed additions or extensions will either 
reproduce the basic formalism or inevitably produce inconsistencies (Jaynes 2003).    
If our goal is applying Bayesian analysis to evidence-intensive process-tracing, Humphreys 
and Jacobs’ (2015) innovative Bayesian model for multimethod research (BIQQ)—designed to 
combine correlational data with process-tracing “clues”—is also more complicated than needed.  
Drawing on medical testing analogies, they classify cases into types (adverse, beneficial, chronic, 
destined) according to the potential outcome a “treatment” would elicit.  Because these types are 
unobservable and carry no information about causal mechanisms, we regard them as nuisance 
parameters.  This setup becomes cumbersome if we are dealing with a single case and searching 
for the best explanation of an outcome that actually occurred, rather than assessing population-
level parameters from a sample.  Instead of conditioning on the case’s hidden type, we can 
directly evaluate the likelihood of observing the evidence conditional on each hypothesis we 
wish to compare, which is much closer to how process tracers approach inference.  Although 
Humphreys and Jacobs outline extensions of their model that accommodate theory comparison, 
they do so in a way that retains the emphasis on proportions of types within a population, 
whereas in our more fully Bayesian approach, causal hypotheses for explaining the known 
outcome of a given case are the primary propositions of interest.  Moreover, the number of BIQQ 
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model parameters grows rapidly as competing causal hypotheses, treatments, potential outcomes, 
and the number and complexity of process-tracing clues increase.  Specifying, let along 
computing, the requisite parameters would be unwieldy for in-depth case analysis. 
We further emphasize that the type of evidence—however distinctions are delimited—does 
not matter for the fundamental logic of Bayesian analysis (although the difficulty of assigning 
probabilities may vary). Evidence may include “causal-process observations” about mechanisms, 
or “data-set observations” with scores on dependent and independent variables (Collier, Brady, 
and Seawright 2010); relatedly, “within-case” observations (Bennett and Checkel 2015:8), or 
cross-case observations.  Evidence may contain information about timing and sequencing, or 
other aspects of causal mechanisms; obtained from archival sources, or interviews. Regardless, 
Bayesian analysis entails evaluating likelihoods—stated more strongly, the evidence enters our 
calculations only through likelihoods. Classification of evidence is beside the point unless it 
helps us evaluate likelihoods. We therefore suspect that categorizing types of process-tracing 
evidence (Beach and Pedersen 2013:99-100) may make a limited contribution to elucidating 
inference. In accord with this view, Collier (2011) simply focuses on “diagnostic evidence”—
which we interpret to mean evidence for which the likelihood varies across hypotheses—as the 
key to process tracing. We add that diagnostic evidence underpins all scientific inference.   
Typologies of test strength are also unnecessary, because confirmation is always a matter 
of degree and is always effected using Bayes’ theorem. Recent scholarship endeavors to give 
Van Evera’s (1997) process-tracing tests (smoking-gun, hoop, doubly-decisive, straw-in-the-
wind) a Bayesian interpretation by replacing the common categorization based on uniqueness 
and certainty (or necessity and sufficiency) with specificity and sensitivity (Humphreys and 
Jacobs 2015, Bennett 2015). While probabilistic understandings were also present in earlier 
treatments (Van Evera 1997, Collier 2011, Mahoney 2012), specificity and sensitivity are more 
naturally probabilistic terms. However, when we move away from the limiting case of deductive 
logic, specificity and sensitivity do not yield a sensible classification of tests. Consider Figure 1, 
which displays Humphreys and Jacobs’ (2015:13) mapping of test types onto “probative value” 
space, defined by the likelihood of observing a clue K under a hypothesis H0 and under a rival 
H1. Notice that all points along any given line drawn from the origin correspond to evidence 
producing the same likelihood ratio when K is found, and hence tests of equal strength that lead 
to identical updating. Test strength increases as the slope of these lines diverges from the 45-
degree diagonal. The dashed lines in Figure 1 show that clues located in distinct test-type regions 
can all have equal strength. Furthermore, small differences in location near the origin generate 
tests of extremely different strengths, whereas Humphreys and Jacobs’ mapping suggests that all 
evidence in this neighborhood is smoking-gun like. While process-tracing tests have made a 
major contribution to qualitative methods, we advocate focusing on likelihood ratios and simply 
following the universal Bayesian procedure for updating probabilities. If test types are still 
desired, they should be based on either weight of evidence or relative entropy (Appendix 2).     
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3.9 Empirical Example  
Appendix 3 applies our best practices to formalize a case study from Fairfield’s (2015) 
research on tax policy change in Latin America. The case—elimination of a regressive tax 
benefit in Chile in 2005—was previously analyzed with both the traditional narrative approach 
and explicit application of process-tracing tests (Fairfield 2013) and therefore facilitates 
methodological comparison with Bayesian analysis. Other efforts to formalize Bayesian process 
tracing examine only a few illustrative pieces of evidence (Rohlfing 2013, Bennett 2015) and/or 
include only highly simplified process-tracing observations (Humphreys and Jacobs 2015). 
We compare Fairfield’s explanation for why the tax reform was approved against three 
rival hypotheses in light of six key observations from the case narrative. We assign likelihoods to 
each piece of evidence, conditioning not only on the background information and the hypothesis 
under consideration, but also on previously-incorporated evidence that may be dependent. In 
assessing likelihoods conditional on each hypothesis, we also carefully consider potential 
instrumental incentives and biases among sources. We then assess the strength of the inference 
jointly derived from the six pieces of evidence and engage in Bayesian sensitivity analysis to 
ascertain how much the conclusions depend on choices of priors and values assigned to 
likelihood ratios. The exercise illustrates how a decibel scale in conjunction with our sound 
analogy facilitates intuitive assignments for the weight of evidence and ensures as much 
consistency as possible when quantifying inherently qualitative information.    
 
4. Pros and Cons of Formalization 
In the context of efforts to establish process tracing as a rigorous methodology and growing 
attention to analytical transparency, scholars have advocated formalizing Bayesian analysis to 
make inferences more systematic, explicit, and amenable to scrutiny (Rohlfing 2013; Bennett 
and Checkel 2015:267; Bennett 2015:297; Humphreys and Jacobs 2015). Formalization forces us 
to clearly identify and carefully consider all salient evidence. It precludes focusing exclusively 
on a working hypothesis by requiring us to consider states of the world characterized by rival 
hypotheses. Formalization may also “eliminate the considerable ambiguity in many verbal 
phrases used to convey probabilities” (Bennett 2015:297). Moreover, formalization holds out the 
possibility of allowing us to analyze and aggregate complex evidence more systematically than 
intuition alone would permit. However, Appendix 3 illustrates that formalization is indeed a 
“very tall order” (Humphreys and Jacobs 2015:42) for evidence-intensive process tracing. As 
such, we must assess both anticipated benefits and potential drawbacks. We begin by discussing 
caveats based on our experience of elaborating Appendix 3 and then consider situations where 
formalization can be valuable despite the challenges. 
   
4.1 Caveats and Limitations 
The foremost challenge of formalization entails assigning numerical values to all 
probabilities (priors and likelihoods). This task is problematic when the data are inherently 
qualitative. Our likelihood values required multiple rounds of revision before they became 
reasonably stable and mutually consistent, and there is no guarantee that we would have arrived 
at the same values had we initially approached the problem using a different sequencing of the 
evidence, or that we would produce at similar values upon redoing the analysis from scratch. We 
view this issue as a fundamental problem that cannot easily be resolved. Specifying a range of 
probabilities rather than a precise value (Humphreys and Jacobs 2015) merely relocates the 
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arbitrariness of quantification.17 While words used to express probability in common parlance are 
certainly ambiguous, quantification may simply disguise that ambiguity with false precision.18      
Although we may be inclined to view formal Bayesian analysis as more rigorous than 
informal inference, the arbitrariness of quantification in qualitative research must give us pause.  
In cases where formalization leads to conclusions that differ from informal analysis, there is no 
way to objectively assess whether those conclusions are better or more correct. Assigning 
numbers does not eliminate subjectivity and intuition; it merely changes how we use our 
intuition. Ultimately, we have only intuition to guide us in judging the quality of inferences, 
whether formal or informal. 
Second, formal Bayesian analysis becomes intractable beyond very simple causal models, 
which are rarely adequate in social science. Recall that formal analysis usually entails specifying 
mutually-exclusive hypotheses, which is nontrivial and may require over-simplification. Some of 
the hypotheses assessed against Fairfield’s (2013) explanation in Appendix 3 involve causal 
mechanisms that—in the real world—could potentially operate simultaneously or in interaction. 
Assessing such possibilities requires carefully elaborating additional, more complex mutually-
exclusive hypotheses and would aggravate the challenges of quantifying likelihoods. By contrast, 
in the natural sciences, Bayesian analysis is usually applied to very simple hypothesis spaces 
(even if the underlying theory and experiments are highly complex); for example: H1 = the Higgs 
boson mass is 124–126 GeV/c2, H2 = the mass is 126–128 GeV/c2, etc.    
Third, practical considerations preclude widespread application of formal Bayesian 
analysis in process tracing research. Appendix 3 exceeds the full length of Fairfield’s (2013) 
article, which included three additional case studies.  We cannot expect scholars to formalize all 
of their cases without producing heavy disincentives for process tracing. 
Finally, formalization should not be equated with transparency. On the one hand, formal 
analysis can obscure rather than clarify inference, especially if we disaggregate the evidence too 
finely and unpack our analysis into too many steps—we may become lost in minutiae. Moreover, 
making too many steps explicit may lull readers into uncritically accepting the author’s 
reasoning, rather than assessing whether they can arrive at the conclusions through their own 
independent logical pathways, thereby undermining the scholarly scrutiny of inferences that 
analytical transparency is intended to promote. Even mathematicians routinely skip steps in 
proofs; readers must fill in and verify themselves, which provides an important cross-check. On 
the other hand, transparency does not require quantification for mathematical application of 
Bayes’ theorem. Scholars can make the assumptions and logic behind their inferences explicit 
without numbers. In other words, we see the issue of clarifying assumptions and explaining the 
rationale underpinning nuanced inferences as distinct from the question of formalization, which 
entails moving qualitative research into the realm of quantitative research. While these 
considerations do not necessarily constitute an argument against formalization, they clarify that 
transparency is not necessarily an argument for formalization.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 To avoid subjective likelihood assignments, Humphreys and Jacobs (2015) include priors on the probative value 
of process-tracing clues; yet the problem then becomes how to translate background knowledge and theoretical 
expectations into an appropriate prior distribution.  Moreover, if we work within a single case, only averages over 
priors for clue probabilities matter, so their approach reduces to specifying likelihoods.   
18 Capoccia and Kelemen (2007:362) similarly note: “While historical arguments relied on assessments of the 
likelihood of various outcomes, it is obviously problematic to assign precise probabilities.”  
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4.2 Applications  
Given the caveats, when might formal Bayesian analysis prove most useful?  Regarding 
which cases to formalize, the value will depend on the evidence.  If all observations strongly 
favor a particular hypothesis, formalization is unlikely to improve on intuition.  Scholars can 
explain why the evidence is decisive without quantifying probabilities, and if the evidence is 
indeed decisive, readers should recognize it as such on its face.  Likewise, if the evidence has 
weak probative value, formalization may simply confirm the realization we would have obtained 
intuitively—the evidence is insufficient to strongly support any particular hypothesis (unless we 
already had strong priors or cannot think of reasonable alternatives).   
The greatest potential gains for inference would arise when the evidence is complex and 
does not clearly favor one hypothesis.  Formalization would ideally help us keep track of 
nuances, consistently assess the weight of evidence for each observation, and systematically 
aggregate inferences across individual observations.  These are precisely the situations where 
using Bayes’ theorem to move from attempting to directly evaluate P(H |E1–N  I ) to instead 
assessing each P(Ex |H E1–x  I )—some Ex’s might fit the hypothesis better than others—would in 
theory be most helpful for leveraging our intuition. 
However, there is a danger when evidence is ambivalent that conclusions derived via 
formalization may simply be driven by arbitrariness inherent in quantification of qualitative 
evidence.  Physicists would only believe that noisy data accumulates into a significant signal if 
the error model is well understood; in qualitative social science, analogous situations may rarely 
arise.  Almost by definition, if the evidence pulls in different directions, small changes in 
probabilities may swing the inference in favor of one hypothesis or another.  Ironically then, the 
cases where formalization ostensibly offers the most leverage are those where it may be most 
vulnerable to arbitrary quantification.    
Nevertheless, formalization in such cases might be merited for the sake of analytical 
transparency and informing future research decisions.  Regarding transparency, if we must make 
inferential claims on the basis of ambivalent or weak evidence—if important questions are at 
stake19 and obtaining better evidence is infeasible—formal analysis could at least clarify the 
basis on which those claims rest and facilitate debate among scholars.  Looking forward to future 
data-gathering opportunities, formalization might also help elucidate what kind of additional 
evidence would be most valuable for strengthening the inference.     
We envision a more important role for formalization in identifying the locus of contention 
when scholars disagree on inferences. As Hunter (1984:88) argues, through formalization, “the 
sources of the disagreement can be determined much more easily than in normal verbal 
analysis.” Formal Bayesian analysis provides a clear framework for pinpointing disagreements: 
Do they arise from different background information and assumptions (e.g. a source’s motives or 
sincerity), different priors, or different assessments of likelihoods? If the problem lies with the 
probative value of evidence, which observations are most contested and why? For these 
purposes, numbers serve primarily to stimulate discussion about inferential logic, assumptions, 
and judgments, and the ad-hoc component of quantification may be less problematic.   
We explore how this clarification and adjudication process might work in Appendix 3.  We 
assign three sets of priors corresponding to different initial probabilities on Fairfield’s (2013) 
explanation and three rivals.  For each prior, we calculate posterior probabilities across scenarios 
where we assign larger or smaller likelihood ratios for the evidence.  This Bayesian sensitivity 
analysis reveals that to remain unconvinced, a skeptical reader would need to have extremely 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Hunter (1984) explores military applications. 
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strong priors against Fairfield’s explanation and/or contend that the evidence is far less 
discriminating than we have argued (Section A3.5).     
We also foresee a valuable pedagogical role for formalization.  Reading examples and 
conducting exercises could familiarize practitioners with Bayesian probability and train intuition 
to follow this inferential logic more systematically, thereby improving informal process tracing.  
For example, one of the most salient lessons from Appendix 3 is that the weight of evidence 
depends by definition on which hypotheses we compare; we cannot judge how decisive the 
evidence is with respect to our working hypothesis alone, without considering concrete 
alternatives.  Thinking in these terms, even without quantifying probabilities, may help scholars 
identify and deploy their most discriminating observations in case narratives.  Appendix 3 also 
demonstrates that the accuracy of a source cannot be assessed a priori.  Even if we trust an 
informant, under some hypotheses, the statements s/he has made may necessarily be untrue. 
Relatedly, elaborating a formal Bayesian appendix for an illustrative case from one’s own 
research might help establish process-tracing “credentials.”  As much as we try to make our 
analysis transparent, multiple analytical steps will inevitably remain implicit.  Qualitative 
research draws on vast amounts of data, often accumulated over multiple years of fieldwork.  
There is simply too much evidence and too much background information that informs how 
evidence is evaluated to fully articulate or catalog.  Qualitative research is not replicable as per a 
laboratory science desideratum; at some level, we must trust that scholars have made sound 
judgments.  To that end, scholars might use a formal illustration to demonstrate their care in 
reasoning about the evidence and the inferences it permits.    
 
4.3 Informal Process-Tracing    
When formal Bayesian analysis is not feasible, there is ample scope to improve inference 
and transparency in traditional narrative-based process tracing. Various recommendations 
following from points discussed in Section 3 can contribute to that end. We should begin by 
identifying the most plausible rival hypotheses and explaining why our background information 
from the outset suggests that some are more likely, or justifies disregarding relevant alternatives 
that are prevalent in the literature. When drawing inferences, we should identify key elements of 
the background information that are not common knowledge and explain how they inform our 
judgments. We should also include enough “thick description” of context and case details 
beyond the key evidence and background information for readers to evaluate alternative 
hypotheses that may not have occurred to us or that we deemed not plausible enough to merit 
explicit consideration. For example, the preference-change hypothesis evaluated in Appendix 3 
appears reasonable on its face, and in retrospect the case narrative could have benefited from 
explicitly assessing that possibility; however, the text included sufficient information for readers 
to independently evaluate and discount that hypothesis. The ease of providing thick description is 
an advantage of narrative process tracing over formalization, where only information relevant to 
inferences on the designated hypothesis set would be catalogued.  
These recommendations are not novel; after all, Bayesian probability “is nothing more than 
common sense reduced to calculation,” (Laplace, in Sivia 2006:13). Similar guidelines have been 
elaborated elsewhere (Bennett and Checkel 2015) and are reflected in longstanding exemplars of 
excellence in qualitative research (Wood 2000, Tannenwald 2007). Our point is to reiterate the 
importance of these recommendations, which are not always followed, and to emphasize their 
critical but not always appreciated methodological grounding in Bayesian probability.      
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Some of the less widely-recognized points in Sections 3 also apply to informal process 
tracing. As in formal analysis, when working with documents, news sources, and interviews, 
informal process-tracers should take as evidence not the content of a statement, but the fact that a 
particular source made the statement; the next step is considering how the source’s potential 
biases and instrumental incentives might change under alternative hypotheses when assessing 
whether the evidence favors a particular explanation.  Informal process-tracers should also be 
aware that contrary to conventional wisdom, distinct sources do not necessarily ensure logically 
independent evidence.  Thinking carefully about logical dependence may be helpful for 
identifying the most discriminating pieces of evidence to showcase in space-constrained 
narratives.  Perhaps most importantly, our sound analogy may aid intuition and reduce ambiguity 
when describing probabilities.  Terms like “highly unlikely” or “plausible” may be interpreted 
very differently across individuals.   In contrast, the sound analogy could establish better 
intersubjective agreement, because it is grounded in universal, concrete, everyday experience.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Bayesian analysis provides a critical methodological foundation for process tracing, a 
common mode of research that is incompatible with frequentistism. Bayesian probability allows 
us to directly ask how plausible a hypothesis is in light of the evidence, facilitates learning and 
knowledge accumulation, and permits inferences from a limited number of observations and/or 
cases. However, we have identified omissions and shortcomings in the nascent Bayesian process-
tracing literature that arise from incomplete understandings of Bayesian probability.      
With respect to formal Bayesian process tracing, our suggested best practices (Table 2) can 
help scholars proceed more consistently and more rigorously.  While operationalizing Bayesian 
analysis is challenging, formalization may be especially valuable for pinpointing the locus of 
disagreements when inferences are contested and for training our reasoning to more closely 
approximate the Bayesian ideal.  
However, we caution against a precipitous move toward quantifying qualitative research.  
Narrative-based process tracing has provided a wealth of knowledge and insights that have 
informed all realms of political science, and imposing a bar as high as formal Bayesian analysis 
could create strong disincentives for scholarship in this tradition, with potentially limited returns 
given arbitrariness in quantification.  Considering that Bayesian probability is an aspirational 
goal for rational inference, when assessing complex evidence and explanatory hypotheses in 
social science, we may need to accept a more intuitive, qualitative approach.  Even in the natural 
sciences, the most ardent advocate of Bayesian probability as extended logic maintained that “in 
practice, the situation faced by the scientist is so complicated that there is little hope of applying 
Bayes’ theorem to give quantitative results about the relative status of theories.  And there is no 
need... common sense is quite adequate for that,” (Jaynes 2003:139). 
We further emphasize that many insights from formal Bayesian analysis have implications 
for the informal, qualitative Bayesianism underlying narrative-based process tracing (Table 2).  
Whether or not scholars decide to formalize, understanding Bayesian probability can help avoid 
pitfalls such as failing to consider whether evidence that ostensibly supports a preferred 
hypothesis fits better with rivals, or assuming that distinct sources ensure independent evidence.  
Investigating whether there is fruitful middle ground between informal and formal 
Bayesian process tracing is an important direction for future research. Thinking in terms of a 
continuum may be helpful. As we move from informal analysis toward what might be called 
“semi-formal” analysis, we would begin to use the language of probability more explicitly (but 
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without using the mathematics of probability). We might make qualitative use of the sound 
analogy, communicating relative probabilities by asking “how loudly the data are talking.” As 
we progress further toward the formal end of the continuum, we might use sound reference levels 
(e.g. the data speak in favor of H1 over H2 at a conversational level). Moving closer toward 
formalization, we might specify the corresponding decibels for the most cogent evidence, 
particularly if it helps us think more explicitly about non-trivial assumptions and reveal 
background information that matters for our judgments. Numbers employed in this type of semi-
formal analysis—without conducting the various internal consistency checks on probability 
assignments necessary for formal analysis—should be viewed only as a way to effectively 
communicate analytical judgments and a stimulus for thinking carefully about the evidence. Full 
formalization (Appendix 3) entails systematically quantifying all probabilities and applying 
Bayes’ theorem to derive an aggregate inference.    
Moving forward, scholars will need to ascertain where the optimal point on this continuum 
lies. It may vary depending on characteristics of the research (e.g. quality of evidence, 
complexity and number of salient hypotheses), as well as how controversial the inferences prove.  
A logical first step, which we are currently undertaking in a related project, entails investigating 
how much inferences change when scholars reason formally as opposed to informally (Bennett 
2015:297). In Appendix 3, we did not discover any instances where formal Bayesian analysis 
diverged from the original case narrative’s conclusions. This consistency could indicate that 
informal reasoning functioned well, or that the intuition underpinning that informal analysis also 
strongly shaped quantification decisions. Whether formal analysis on a case with less decisive 
evidence would produce different conclusions compared to informal analysis remains an open 
question. Beyond analyzing whether inferences differ, we also need to ask how compelling the 
research community finds conclusions reached from informal vs. formal or semi-informal 
analysis, and whether the latter approaches facilitate consensus-building.     
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 Table 2: Guidelines for Bayesian Process Tracing 
 
 Formal Analysis Informal Analysis 
1. Hypothesis space Articulate clearly-specified, mutually 
exclusive hypotheses. Do not attempt to 
directly compare H vs. ~H. 
Articulate and compare plausible 
alternative hypotheses.  Where possible, 
think in terms of mutually exclusive 
rivals.   
2. Priors a) Identify a natural set of hypotheses 
and assign indifference priors, and/or 
b) Explain why background information 
motivates a particular choice of 
subjective prior probabilities. 
Explain why background information 
suggests some hypotheses and/or justifies 
disregarding from the outset any relevant 
hypotheses that are prevalent in the 
literature or appear plausible on their 
face. 
3. Background information Identify key elements of background information that are not general knowledge. 
Explain how these elements inform 
likelihoods. 
Explain how these elements inform 
inferences. 
Include “thick description” for readers to 
evaluate how evidence fits explanations 
that are not explicitly considered. 
4. Likelihood of evidence Take as evidence E =“source S stated X” 
and directly assess the likelihood  
P(E |Hx Eprev I) under alternative 
hypotheses. 
Take as evidence not the content of a 
statement, but the fact that a particular 
source made the statement. 
Consider how potential biases and instrumental incentives attributed to sources might 
change under alternative hypotheses.   
5. Logical dependence   Condition the likelihood for each 
additional piece of evidence on all 
evidence that has already been 
incorporated, thinking carefully about 
potential logical dependencies given the 
hypothesis under consideration.  
Seek evidence from multiple different 
types of sources, but recognize that 
distinct sources do not necessarily ensure 
logically independent evidence.   
Consider logical dependence when 
looking for the most discriminating 
pieces of evidence to showcase. 
6. Probability assignments   Quantify priors and likelihoods on a 
logarithmic scale, using the sound-levels 
analogy to enhance consistency and 
leverage intuition.  
Informal use of the sound analogy (“how 
loudly is the data talking?”) may aid 
intuition and reduce ambiguity when 
describing probabilities. 
7. Tests  Test types are superfluous, but if desired 
must be based on likelihood ratios or 
relative entropy, not likelihoods.  
Avoid heuristic use of traditional process 
tracing tests unless evidence is truly 
necessary or sufficient for a hypothesis. 
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Appendices  
 
A1. Evidence and Accuracy 
Some scholars have attempted to articulate a notion of the accuracy of evidence for 
Bayesian analysis that assesses the reliability of the source independently of the hypotheses 
under consideration (Beach and Pedersen 2013:126-28, see also Bennett and Checkel 2015: 24-
25).20  While this approach may be appropriate in some situations in the physical sciences where 
the accuracy of a measurement device does not depend on the hypothesis being tested, it may 
foster errors if applied to process tracing.  We do not make separate assessments of the accuracy 
of information X provided by source S.  Instead, we should directly evaluate the likelihood that 
“source A stated X,” given a particular hypothesis and our background information.   
To illustrate, suppose E represents the evidence that informant S made a statement X (in 
some context C, for example, an interview with the author).  Evaluating each likelihood P(E|Hi I) 
will require assessing the informant’s potential motives to assert X under a given hypothesis, as 
well as assessing the informant’s overall sincerity, knowledgeability, and judgment using the 
background information (independent of the hypotheses).  In general, the accuracy of the 
statement X—which should be understood as the probability that X is true given that that the 
informant asserted it—depends on the hypothesis under consideration.  The motives we attribute 
to the informant and hence the probability that s/he is speaking the truth may vary across 
hypotheses.  Furthermore, it may be the case that a hypothesis directly implies that X is true, and 
hence the statement is accurate, regardless of whether we trust the informant more generally or 
whether we believe s/he is in a position to have correct information.  Under a different 
hypothesis, we may ascertain that X cannot be true, in which case the statement is not accurate, 
and E must have occurred because the informant was either mistaken or lying.  If we expand 
P(X|E I) using the assumption (contained in the background information) that we are considering 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses H1-HN,      
 𝑃 𝑋 𝐸  𝐼 = 𝑃 𝑋  (𝐻1 + 𝐻2 +⋯+ 𝐻!) 𝐸  𝐼 = 𝑃 𝑋  𝐻1 𝐸  𝐼 +⋯+   𝑃 𝑋  𝐻!|𝐸  𝐼  = 𝑃 𝑋 𝐸  𝐻1  𝐼   𝑃 𝐻1 𝐸  𝐼 +⋯+ 𝑃 𝑋 𝐻!  𝐸  𝐼   𝑃 𝐻!   𝐸  𝐼)    ,                                                                                                  (𝐴1.1) 
 
where P(X|E Hi I) can be regarded as the hypothesis-dependent accuracy—the conditional 
probability that X is true given both that the informant asserted the statement E and that a 
particular hypothesis Hi holds.  But note that we now have factors P(Hi |E I) which must be 
calculated using Bayes’ rule: P(Hi |E I) = P(E |Hi I) P(Hi |I) ⁄ P(E |I), and we are back to the task 
of assessing P(E |Hi I), which we can (and in practice must) do directly, without recourse to  
P(X |E I). 
We can only move from assessing P(E |Hi I) to considering P(X |Hi I) in special cases 
where (a) we judge the accuracy of a statement to be very high across hypotheses, and (b) we 
judge incentives for the informant to reveal X if it is in fact the truth to be nearly the same across 
hypotheses.  Suppose we wish to calculate likelihood ratios P(E |Hi I) ⁄ P(E |Hj I).  Since X and 
~X are mutually exclusive and exhaustive (X is either true or false),  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Beach and Pedersen (2013: 127) base their discussion of the “accuracy of evidence” on Howson and Urbach’s 
(2006: 107-113) treatment of a very different problem—how evidence affects credence in primary and auxiliary 
hypotheses.  However, Howson and Urbach’s example is not applicable to assessing the accuracy of sources in 
qualitative social science.  
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 𝑃 𝐸 𝐻!   𝐼𝑃 𝐸 𝐻!   𝐼 = 𝑃   𝐸   𝑋 + ~𝑋 𝐻!   𝐼)𝑃 𝐸   𝑋 + ~𝑋   𝐻!   𝐼 =    𝑃 𝐸  𝑋 𝐻!   𝐼 + 𝑃 𝐸  ~𝑋 𝐻!   𝐼𝑃 𝐸  𝑋 𝐻!   𝐼 + 𝑃 𝐸  ~𝑋 𝐻!   𝐼     ,                                                                                                    (𝐴1.2)	  	   	       	  
If the hypothesis-dependent accuracy of X is very high, such that P(~X |E Hn, I) is negligibly 
small for every Hn, then the joint probability P(E ~X |Hn, I) = P(~X |E Hn, I)*P(E |Hn I) is also 
negligibly small because P(E |Hn I) ≤ 1.  Equation (A1.2) then becomes: 
 𝑃 𝐸 𝐻!   𝐼𝑃 𝐸 𝐻!   𝐼 ≈ 𝑃 𝐸  𝑋 𝐻!   𝐼)𝑃 𝐸  𝑋|  𝐻!   𝐼 =    𝑃 𝑋 𝐻!   𝐼   𝑃 𝐸 𝑋  𝐻!   𝐼𝑃 𝑋 𝐻!   𝐼   𝑃 𝐸   𝑋  𝐻!   𝐼   ,                                                                                                                                                          (𝐴1.3)	  
 
If it is also the case that incentives for the informant to state X when X is true do not vary 
appreciably across the hypotheses, then the second factor in the numerator and denominator 
above are almost equal and approximately cancel out, leaving us with 
 𝑃 𝐸 𝐻!   𝐼𝑃 𝐸 𝐻!   𝐼 ≈ 𝑃 𝑋 𝐻!   𝐼𝑃 𝑋 𝐻!   𝐼     ,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      (𝐴1.4)	  
 
where we can now replace E with X in our likelihood ratio assessments.  It is important to note 
that if X flatly contradicts a hypothesis Hn, then we cannot proceed in this manner, because 
conditioning on the conjunction of X and Hn as in equation (A1.3) above would be nonsensical.  
In such cases, we must have P(X |Hn I) = 0, which implies that P(E X |Hn I) = 0, and therefore, 
regardless of how strongly our background information inclines us to trust our informant, we 
must infer that the informant was either mistaken or not speaking the truth: P(E ~X |Hn I) = 1.  
However, if we do have a high level of trust in the informant, we would assign a very low 
probability to the likelihood P(E |Hn I).  To the extent that X and Hn are not flatly contradictory 
but are jointly highly improbable, we can also expect P(E |Hn I) to be very small if we trust our 
informants.   
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A2.  Bayesian Test Types and Test Strengths 
In the deterministic (deductive-logic) limit, Van Evera’s (1997) process-tracing tests can be 
used to compare two rival hypotheses (i.e. mutually exclusive and assumed exhaustive), H1 and 
H0, in light of a single clue, which can turn out to be present (K) or absent (~K).21  If the clue is 
certain to occur under H1, but is not unique to H1 (such that K is possible under H0),22 then 
searching for K entails a hoop test for H1.  H1 passes the hoop test if the clue is found (lending 
mild support for H1) and fails if the clue is absent (refuting H1).  A smoking-gun test for H1 
involves a clue that is not certain under H1 but is unique to H1, such that the hypothesis passes if 
the clue is found (confirming H1) and fails otherwise (providing mildly disconfirming evidence 
for H1).  A doubly-decisive test involves a clue that is both certain under and unique to H1, so 
that either clue outcome is decisive—the test acts simultaneously as a hoop and a smoking gun, 
confirming H1 and disconfirming H0.  Notice that a hoop test for H1 with respect to K is a 
smoking gun test for H0 with respect to ~K, and vice-versa.  Van Evera (1997) referred to 
instances where clue outcomes are neither certain nor unique as straw-in-the-wind tests that only 
mildly support or cast doubt on the hypotheses.  In terms of informativeness, doubly-decisive 
tests are stronger than hoop and smoking-gun tests, which in turn are stronger than straw-in-the-
wind tests.  However, Van Evera did not provide a precise measure of test strength.   
Van Evera and subsequent authors acknowledged that truly certain (necessary) or unique 
(sufficient) evidence is rare for complex hypotheses.  For the test typology to be useful in 
practice, the notions of certainty and uniqueness must somehow be relaxed from absolute logical 
categories to matters of degree.  Borrowing from the medical diagnostics literature, Bennett 
(2015:283) and Humphreys and Jacobs (2015) use the concepts of sensitivity and specificity, 
defined such that the test’s sensitivity to K under H1 is the likelihood P(K|H1 I), and the 
specificity of the test for H1 equals 1–P(K|H0 I).   
However, in Section 3.8, we explained that these clue likelihoods are not a good way to 
generalize process-tracing tests to a fully probabilistic world where confirmation is a matter of 
degree.  We showed that clues located in regions labeled by different test types in Humphreys 
and Jacobs’ probative-value space can all produce exactly the same updating.  Further, while 
Humphreys and Jacobs (2015:68) recognize that: “a belief can gain support from data that are 
unlikely under that belief—as long as those data are even more unlikely under the alternatives,” 
their figure incorrectly suggests that all evidence in the neighborhood of the origin will be 
smoking-gun like, even though small differences in location near the origin actually generate 
tests of extremely different strengths. 
Instead of likelihoods, we develop three Bayesian alternatives that are better suited for 
mapping process-tracing tests in “probative-value space”: (1) weights of evidence, (2) relative 
entropies, and (3) expected information gain.  While we maintain that typologies of test strength 
are unnecessary, because we always update probabilities in the same way using Bayes theorem 
once the data are in hand, relative entropies and expected information gain may be of interest at 
the pre-data stage of research.  However, the discussion below applies only when just two rival 
hypotheses are relevant to the problem and the evidence in question can sensibly be treated as 
binary. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 More generally, we can work with any binary evidence that may assume one of two possible values or outcomes.   
22 Instead of certainty and uniqueness, we can equivalently speak of clues that are necessary implications of or 
sufficient conditions for a hypothesis.   
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A2.1 Weights of Evidence 
When updating the odds on H1 vs. H0, it is the likelihood ratio that matters, not the 
individual likelihoods.  The weights of evidence are therefore more sensible coordinates than the 
clue likelihoods for classifying process-tracing tests.  Recall that the weights of evidence 
corresponding to the clue’s presence (K) or absence (~K), are proportional to the logarithm of the 
likelihood ratios: 
 𝑊! ∝ log 𝑃 𝐾 𝐻o  𝐼𝑃(𝐾|𝐻o  𝐼)  
 𝑊~! ∝ log 𝑃 ~𝐾 𝐻1  𝐼𝑃 ~𝐾 𝐻o  𝐼    =    log 1 − 𝑃 𝐾 𝐻1  𝐼1 − 𝑃 𝐾 𝐻o  𝐼   .                                                                                                                                                                      (𝐴2.1)   
 
Figure A2.1 plots probative-value space with respect to WK and W~K.  One of the weights 
of evidence must always be non-negative and the other non-positive, because a given hypotheses 
cannot be favored regardless of whether the clue is found or not.  Quadrants I and III in Figure 
A2.1 are therefore disallowed regions.  In addition, if one weight of evidence is zero, the other 
must be zero as well, because a test that is completely uninformative upon observing the clue 
must also be uninformative if the clue is not observed.   
As WK becomes very large compared to the absolute value of W~K (Quadrant IV above the 
diagonal), the test becomes increasingly like Van Evera’s smoking gun for H1.  As WK grows 
very negative but large in absolute value compared to W~K (Quadrant II below the diagonal), the 
test becomes more like a smoking gun for H0.   
As W~K becomes very negative but large in absolute value relative to WK, (Quadrant IV 
below the diagonal), the test becomes increasingly like a hoop for H1.  As W~K becomes very 
large and positive compared to the absolute value of WK (Quadrant II above the diagonal), the 
test becomes increasingly like a hoop for H0.   
If both |WK | and |W~K | are large, the test becomes doubly-decisive.  In contrast, small 
magnitudes of both weights of evidence in the interior regions of Quadrants II and IV correspond 
to straw-in-the-wind tests.  The degree of double-decisiveness increases with distance from the 
origin along the dotted diagonal line in Figure A2.1.  Distance transverse to the diagonal line 
reflects asymmetry in decisiveness with respect to the presence vs. absence of the clue.  
By using weights of evidence as coordinates, we stretch out the regions in probative-value 
space where one or both of the likelihoods P(K |H1 I) and P(K |H0 I) is close to zero or one.  The 
edges of Humphreys and Jacobs’ (2015) diagram representing ideal hoop, smoking-gun, and 
doubly-decisive tests are pushed off to infinity, which indicates their singular nature 
(corresponding to the limiting case of deductive logic).  
Meanwhile, the entire diagonal line of no discrimination (corresponding to totally 
uninformative tests) in Humphreys and Jacobs’ diagram is projected to the origin in Figure A2.1. 
Test decisiveness if the clue turns out to be present increases with horizontal distance from the 
origin |WK |, while test decisiveness if the clue ends up absent increases with vertical distance 
from the origin |W~K |.    
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Figure A2.1 
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A2.2 Relative Entropies  
While weights of evidence better generalize Van Evera’s typology to cases where the 
evidence is neither strictly unique nor certain, they emphasize distinctions between decisiveness 
if the clue is found and if it is not found, an outcome we cannot know at the pre-data stage of 
research.  Instead, we can directly assess the discriminating strength of the test—the degree to 
which the test will typically lead to a large weight of evidence in favor of one hypothesis or the 
other, which should be the quantity of most interest before we have gathered data.   
We proceed by averaging the weights of evidence over the possibilities of clue presence or 
clue absence.  If H1 is true, the expected weight of evidence in favor of that hypothesis is 
proportional to: 
 𝐷 𝐻1  ;𝐻o = 𝑃 𝐾 𝐻1  𝐼 log 𝑃 𝐾 𝐻1  𝐼𝑃 𝐾 𝐻o  𝐼 + 1 − 𝑃(𝐾|𝐻1    𝐼)    log 1 − 𝑃 𝐾 𝐻1  𝐼1 − 𝑃 𝐾 𝐻o  𝐼    
 = 𝑃 𝐾 𝐻1  𝐼 𝑊! + 𝑃 ~𝐾 𝐻1  𝐼 𝑊~!     .                                                                                                                                                                                (𝐴2.2) 
 
If instead H0  is true, the expected weight of evidence in favor of that hypothesis is proportional 
to:  
 𝐷 𝐻o  ;𝐻1 = 𝑃 𝐾 𝐻o  𝐼 log 𝑃 𝐾 𝐻o  𝐼𝑃 𝐾 𝐻1  𝐼 + 1 − 𝑃(𝐾|𝐻o  𝐼)    log 1 − 𝑃 𝐾 𝐻o  𝐼1 − 𝑃 𝐾 𝐻1  𝐼    
 = −𝑃 𝐾 𝐻o  𝐼   𝑊! − 𝑃 ~𝐾 𝐻o  𝐼   𝑊~!     .                                                                                                                                                                    (𝐴2.3) 
 
The quantity D(H1 ; H0) is known as the relative entropy, Kullback-Leibler number, or 
discrimination information for H1 against H0.  D(H0 ; H1) is the relative entropy dual to  
D(H1 ; H0).  Such quantities play an important role in information theory and statistics.    
The relative entropies measure the expected information to be gained regarding the 
plausibility of the hypotheses upon learning the outcome of the clue variable.  The larger  
D(H1 ; H0), the more we expect the test to speak in favor of H1 if that hypothesis is in fact true, 
and similarly for D(H0 ; H1).  Both relative entropies are always non-negative, ranging from zero 
to infinity.  They vanish jointly when the probabilistic clue predictions do not differ across the 
hypotheses, such that the test cannot adjudicate between them, but are otherwise both non-zero. 
Relative entropies should be regarded only as “pseudo-coordinates” on probative-value 
space, because we cannot invert them to recover clue likelihoods.  In other words, if we have 
clue likelihoods, we can calculate relative entropies, but we cannot calculate clue likelihoods 
from relative entropies because these quantities by design averaged away information about 
whether the clue or its absence led to the more decisive outcome. 
Relative entropies nevertheless provide us with useful information about test strength 
before we observe the clue variable.  Figure A2.2 plots probative-value space with respect to the 
entropic pseudo-coordinates.  Expected discriminating strength if H1 is true increases with 
horizontal distance from the origin, while expected discriminating strength if H0 is true increases 
with vertical distance from the origin.  Double-decisiveness increases along the main diagonal, 
while distance transverse to the main diagonal reflects asymmetry in expected information gain 
depending on which hypothesis is true.  As D(H1 ; H0) becomes large, we approach either a hoop 
test for H1 or a smoking gun test for H0.  While the relative entropy cannot distinguish these two 
possibilities, the distinction is largely irrelevant.  A hoop for H1 or a smoking gun for H0 will 
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either substantially boost the posterior probability of H0 relative to H1, or else add little 
evidentiary weight.  Likewise, as D(H0 ; H1) grows large, we approach either a smoking gun for 
H1 or a hoop for H0.  These tests will either substantially boost the posterior probability of H1 
relative to H0, or else add little evidentiary weight.  Small to moderate values of both relative 
entropies are indicative of straw-in-the wind tests. 
 
 
Figure A2.2 
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A2.3 Test Strength as Expected Information Gain 
At the pre-data stage, it makes sense not only to average over possible clue outcomes, but 
also to average over our prior uncertainty regarding which hypothesis is correct.  In this way we 
can obtain the overall discrimination information, or expected information gain, from the test: 
 𝐷 = 𝑃 𝐻1   𝐼   𝐷 𝐻1  ;𝐻o + 𝑃 𝐻o 𝐼   𝐷 𝐻o  ;𝐻1  
 = 𝑃 𝐻1   𝐼 𝐷 𝐻1  ;𝐻o + 1 − 𝑃 𝐻1   𝐼)   𝐷(𝐻o  ;𝐻1)  .                                                                                                                                                      (𝐴2.4) 
 
The quantity D is the most natural pre-data measure of test strength, which tells us how 
loudly we expect the test to speak in favor of the best hypothesis.  It ranges from zero to positive 
infinity.  It is zero if and only if the clue probabilities under both hypotheses are the same, such 
that no learning can take place from the evidence.  It is infinite if and only if one of the two 
relative entropies is infinite, meaning there must be at least one clue outcome that is impossible 
under one hypothesis yet possible under the other.  D treats both hypotheses and both clue 
outcomes on equal footings, in that it is invariant under exchanging the roles of H0 and H1 and/or 
K and ~K.  D effectively combines clue likelihoods and priors on the hypotheses into a single 
measure of the expected amount of information relevant to adjudicating between the hypotheses. 
While no additional quantities beyond D are necessary for assessing test strength, a second, 
independent function is useful if we want to be able to invert back to the relative entropy pseudo-
coordinates.  A natural choice is some measure of the expected asymmetry of test decisiveness 
with respect to the two hypotheses—for example, the between-hypothesis component of the 
variance in the weight of evidence.  The square root of this variance,      
 ∆   𝐻1  ;𝐻o =    𝑃(𝐻1 𝐼   𝑃(𝐻o|𝐼)  ×   𝐷 𝐻1  ;𝐻o − 𝐷(𝐻o  ;𝐻1)     ,                                                                                                                    (𝐴2.5) 
 
is convenient for this purpose. 
Figure A2.3 plots the asymmetry Δ versus the information gain D.  Weak tests fall close to 
the origin; test strength increases with the value of D.  Smaller values of Δ indicate greater 
symmetry, or more doubly-decisive tests.  Strong but singly-decisive tests (hoop or smoking-
gun) occur for large values of D and large values of Δ; the sign of Δ indicates the hypothesis 
under which the test is expected to be more decisive. 
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Figure A2.3 
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A3. Applying Formal Bayesian Analysis to Qualitative Case Research: 
An Empirical Example   
To illustrate how Bayesian logic underpins qualitative research, we provide an application 
to Fairfield’s (2015) work on tax policy change in Latin America.  Fairfield (2013) elaborated a 
methodological appendix that we believe is the first published account that explicitly uses 
process-tracing tests to elucidate causal inferences in the author’s case narratives.  In the 
following exercise, which is also the first of its kind, we revise that appendix by replacing the 
language of process-tracing tests with direct applications of Bayes’ theorem.  While we advocate 
a Bayesian approach to inference over process-tracing tests, which remain close in spirit to a 
frequentist approach, we wish to stress from the outset the difficulty of quantifying probabilities 
in the complex world of social science.        
In Private Wealth and Public Revenue in Latin America, Fairfield (2015) analyzes how and 
when unequal democracies can tax economic elites.  Fairfield explains the scope and fate of tax 
policy proposals by analyzing business’s instrumental (political) power and structural 
(investment) power.  Instrumental power entails deliberate political actions like lobbying.  
Structural power arises from the profit-maximizing behavior of firms and investors; if 
policymakers anticipate that a reform will provoke disinvestment or capital flight, they may rule 
it out to protect growth and employment.  When business actors have strong power of either 
type, their interests shape policy decisions.  However, strategies for mobilizing public support or 
tempering elite opposition can facilitate incremental reforms that might not otherwise be 
feasible.  One such strategy—a vertical equity appeal—aims to mobilize public support by 
emphasizing a tax increases’ congruence with the widely-accepted principle that those who earn 
more or own more assets should bear a larger share of the tax burden.  
Fairfield’s (2013) article on tax reform strategies includes the case of a 2005 Chilean 
reform that eliminated a longstanding tax benefit (article “57 bis”) for owners of new-issue 
stocks who belonged to the richest 0.5%.  During the presidential campaign, Chile’s Catholic 
bishops forcefully denounced the country’s extreme levels of inequality, thereby raising the 
salience of this issue.  Right-coalition candidate Lavín responded by blaming Chile’s persistent 
inequality on the governing left coalition and accusing incumbent president Lagos of failing to 
deliver his promise of growth with equity.  Lagos seized the opportunity to eliminate article 57 
bis by linking the reform to the issue of inequality and thereby mobilizing public support with 
the following equity appeal: “The famous Article 57 bis is still in force and signifies a 
tremendous source of inequality.  …Instead of just talking, why don’t we agree to eliminate 57 
bis in less than 24 hours?”23  The right, which held a majority in the senate, accepted the 
challenge and voted in favor of eliminating the tax benefit, deviating from its prior position on 
this policy as well as the preferences of its core constituency—business owners and upper-
income individuals.  Before proceeding, readers may wish to read Fairfield’s (2013) original case 
narrative (Appendix 4).  
This case was chosen for explicit consideration of process-tracing tests for both substantive 
and practical reasons.  Substantively, the 2005 reform was an emblematic case of equity-
enhancing tax reform in Chile that illustrates both the importance of strategies that mobilize 
public support and the limitations to how much revenue they can raise in contexts of strong 
business power.  Practically, this is a clear-cut case in which a relatively small number of key 
pieces of evidence establish the causal importance of the reform strategy.  As the complexity of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23Lagos, quoted in “Lagos reta a Alianza a derogar exención tributaria en 24 horas,” El Mercurio, May 10, 2005. 
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the case and the quantity of evidence the analyst draws on to make inferences increase, explicit 
elaboration of either process tracing tests or the formal Bayesian reasoning we employ here may 
become infeasible.   
 
A3.1 Specifying Hypotheses  
Fairfield (2013, 2015) argues that Lagos’ equity appeal, which took place in an unusual 
context of strong electoral competition from the right coalition on the issue of inequality, was 
critical for eliminating 57 bis.  The postulated causal mechanism is that in this unusual context, 
the equity appeal created concern within the right coalition that rejecting the tax initiative would 
damage its candidate’s electoral prospects.   
 
HEA: Lagos’ equity appeal, in the context of a presidential campaign where 
inequality had assumed high issue-salience, drove the right to accept the 2005 
reform in order to avoid electoral costs.   
 
~HEA: The right would have accepted the 2005 reform anyway—without the 
equity appeal in the context of a major electoral campaign where inequality had 
assumed high issue-salience.  In other words, those factors did not have an 
important causal effect on the fate of the reform initiative.   
 
Whereas frequentists usually consider a single null hypothesis and its negation, applying Bayes’ 
theorem requires elaborating a complete set of mutually exclusive hypotheses.  We need to 
explicitly state the alternatives before we can reason meaningfully about the likelihood of 
observing the evidence if the author’s hypothesis does not hold (see Section 3.7).  To that end, 
we decompose ~HEA into three rival alternative hypotheses:  
 
HI: The right accepted the reform because Chile’s institutionalized party system 
and stable rules of the game motivate cross-partisan cooperation in congress and 
consensual politics (drawing on Flores-Macías 2010).  These institutions lengthen 
time horizons and encourage parties to moderate their policy stances in 
anticipation of future rounds of negotiation on other issues.   
 
HP: The right accepted the reform because the preferences of its core 
constituency—business and upper-income individuals—had changed.  Over time, 
the number of individuals benefitting from 57 bis had declined as owners sold 
their new-issue stocks and acquired other assets,24 so the right’s core constituency 
no longer had a material interest in defending the tax benefit.   
 
HMV: The right accepted the 2005 reform in accord with a simple median voter 
model of redistributive politics, where electoral competition drives politicians to 
converge on policies that promote the median voters’ material interests (e.g. 
Meltzer and Richard 1981).  In other words, Lagos’ equity appeal and the specific 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24A reform in the 1990s had precluded new entrants but grandfathered in existing beneficiaries (Fairfield 2015, 
Chapter 4).   
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context in which it took place were irrelevant for obtaining right votes in support 
of eliminating 57 bis.  
 
It is important to note that we are assuming as part of our background information that 
these alternative hypotheses are mutually exclusive and exhaustive—in other words, only one of 
the mechanisms corresponding to the four different hypotheses may operate.  Otherwise we 
cannot maintain that ~HEA = HI + HP + HMV.  In the real world, one could imagine that the equity 
appeal might work to create consensus between the right and the left, but that logic corresponds 
to a more complex causal hypothesis that blends elements of both HEA and HI.  Similarly, it 
might be the case that changing business preferences in conjunction with the equity appeal 
motivated the right to accept the reform, such that a combination of both HEA and HP was critical 
to the outcome.  Allowing for causal complexity in which multiple mechanisms operate at the 
same time, to varying degrees or in interaction, would require elaborating additional, more 
complicated mutually exclusive hypotheses, which can be challenging if we wish to be precise 
enough to apply formal Bayesian analysis (Section 3.2).  
 
A3.2 Assigning Priors 
We consider three different prior distributions for the four hypotheses.  For the first prior, 
we employ the indifference principle and set equal probabilities of 25% on each hypothesis, 
since from a position of maximal ignorance I0, we have no reason to privilege any one of the four 
explanations.  This approach aims to approximate objective Bayesianism (Section 3.3); however, 
it ignores the background information we bring to the analysis for lack of any feasible way to 
systematically build up from I0 to incorporate our full background information I.    
The second prior distribution aims to take into consideration the large body of literature 
questioning the logic underlying simple median-voter models.  Authors have identified numerous 
assumptions in these models that do not hold up against empirical evidence—not only for 
developed countries like the US (Hacker and Pierson 2010), but also for developing countries 
(Kaufman 2009).  For the case of Chile, Luna (2014) analyzes in detail how right parties have 
successfully defended the economic interests of their core upper-income constituency while still 
managing to win broad support among low-income voters who would stand to benefit from 
redistribution.  Accordingly, we place a low subjective prior probability on HMV of 0.001% and 
equal probabilities on HEA, HI, and HP of 33.3%.  These assignments correspond to a prior log-
odds ratio of 45 dB against HMV relative to each of the other hypotheses.  Using our sound 
analogy (Section 3.6), we could say that HMV is “sleeping” in the background, and it would take 
roughly 45 dB to “wake it up” (Table 1 below).  It is worth emphasizing that from a more 
objective Bayesian perspective, instead of relying on our intuition to penalize HMV we should 
begin with our indifference priors and systematically incorporate every piece of evidence we 
have that bears on the hypotheses.  That approach is clearly infeasible in practical terms.  For 
example, we would need to assess every piece of qualitative and quantitative evidence that Luna 
(2014) provides in his extensive analysis, not to mention all other works in the large body of 
literature on median voter theories and redistribution.  
The third prior distribution, which is also subjective in nature, draws on comments received 
from a reviewer on a draft of Fairfield’s 2013 article.  The reviewer expressed significant 
skepticism that a presidential appeal could affect reform outcomes, citing examples from US 
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politics in which such appeals “are generally ineffective in moving public opinion.”25  In line 
with the reviewer’s beliefs, we assign a very low subjective prior on HEA of 0.0003%26 and set 
equal probabilities on HI, HP, and HMV of 33.3%.  These priors penalize HEA by 50 decibels 
relative to any of the other three hypotheses.  Continuing with our sound analogy, if the three 
alternative hypotheses are considered to be in conversation, the equity appeal hypothesis 
corresponds to a pin-drop in the background.  For pedagogical purposes, we will subsequently 
assess the reviewer’s objection that “the case studies make a number of claims that seem to run 
counter to what we know about political behavior and which therefore require greater 
substantiation” by updating the subjective priors in light of the evidence Fairfield (2013) brings 
to bear on the 2005 Chilean reform.   
 
Table 1: Typical sound levels (dB)   
(Reproduced from Section 3.6) 
 
10 Adult hearing threshold; rustling leaves, pin-drop  
20-25 Whisper  
30 Quiet bedroom or library, ticking watch 
45 Sufficient to wake a sleeping person  
50 Moderate rainstorm   
60 Typical conversation   
70 Noisy restaurant, common TV level  
80 Busy curbside, typical alarm clock   
90 Passing diesel truck or motorcycle     
100 Dance club, construction cite  
115 Rock concert, baby screaming   
 
 
A3.3 Assessing Likelihoods of Evidence   
We next consider the six key pieces of evidence (E1–E6) that Fairfield (2013) examines 
when analyzing the 2005 Chilean reform.  This evidence includes not only observations about 
the causal process operating within the 2005 tax reform case, but also evidence from previous 
episodes of tax reform and non-reform that bear on the hypotheses (see E1 and E3).  Our analysis 
accordingly illustrates how Bayesian logic seamlessly integrates both with-in case and cross-case 
observations—not just for mixed-method research designs that combine large-N datasets with 
qualitative mechanism observations (Humphreys and Jacobs 2015), but also for qualitative 
small-N and medium-N comparative research.  Our analysis thus shows how Bayesian logic 
underpins qualitative research, without need to distinguish between within-case and cross-case 
analysis.     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Note however that in Fairfield’s analysis, given the absence of relevant polls, what matters is whether politicians 
believed that public opinion supported Chile’s 2005 reform, not whether public opinion objectively did favor the 
reform.  
26 Jaynes (2003: 99-100) similarly employs 10–6 as a “very low prior probability” in his example of testing 
hypotheses about widget quality.  
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To apply Bayes’ theorem, we need to assign conditional probabilities, or likelihoods, 
denoted P(Ex |Hj Eprev I) to each piece of evidence Ex.  In other words, we must quantify how 
likely a given piece of evidence Ex is to be found under each of the four hypotheses, {Hj, j = EA, I, 
P, MV}, conditional on the pieces of evidence that we have previously incorporated into our 
analysis, Eprev, and on our background information, I.   
Assigning numerical values, or even rank ordering these probabilities, is challenging.  
Ideally, one should reason out each probability in the problem and then calculate likelihood 
ratios P(Ex |Hj Eprev I) ⁄ P(Ex |Hk Eprev I) to assess how much a given piece of evidence 
discriminates between a pair of hypotheses.  In practice, however, it is very difficult to assess 
what absolute value a likelihood should assume when conditioning a piece of evidence on a 
hypothesis that simply does not fit.  We know the likelihood of viewing the evidence should be 
very low, but our intuition gives us little traction for discerning whether that likelihood should be 
lower or higher than the probability of viewing some other piece of evidence that is extremely 
unlikely under another hypothesis.  Our brains simply are not accustomed to making judgments 
on these scales—it is very difficult to assess differences between probabilities that are extremely 
small.  To circumvent this problem, we opted for the following approach.   
First, we set values for the likelihood of each piece of evidence under the most compatible 
hypothesis—this task entails handling probabilities in a range for which we feel capable of 
making reasonable assignments.  Second, we used our intuition to assess how large the log-
likelihood ratio should be for each piece of evidence relative to the rival hypotheses.  This 
approach is natural since only the relative probabilities of observing the evidence under different 
hypotheses matter for assessing which explanation fits best, and because it is easier for our brains 
to perceive and interpret differences on a logarithmic scale (Section 3.6).  For evidence that 
strongly discriminates between two hypotheses, we assign a likelihood ratio of 103, making the 
weight of evidence (ten times the log of the likelihood ratio) 30 decibels.  Employing the analogy 
of inference as a dialog with the data, 30 decibels in acoustic terms roughly corresponds to the 
difference between a quiet bedroom and an ordinary conversation—in other words, the data are 
“talking clearly.”  Very low probabilities were then determined by the baseline probability of the 
evidence in question under the most compatible hypothesis and the likelihood ratio relative to the 
rival hypotheses.  We adjusted low probabilities as necessary when a clear argument could be 
made that a given likelihood should be higher or lower than another likelihood in the exercise.  
Our lowest probability assignments, for evidence that we view as exceedingly unlikely under a 
given hypothesis, are on the order of 10–5: extremely improbable, but a healthy order of 
magnitude higher than being struck by lightening over a lifetime (10–6) and several orders of 
magnitude larger than other relevant improbable perils such as experiencing a plane crash on a 
major airline (10–7) or winning a major lottery (10–8).   
Readers may nevertheless object that our lowest probabilities are too small.  In response, 
we emphasize that we are using a logarithmic scale because humans have evolved to deal with 
probabilities that vary over orders of magnitude.  A logarithmic scale is actually better suited to 
human perception than a more familiar linear scale, once we become accustomed to working in 
decibels.  Moreover, our two-step procedure for assigning improbable likelihoods minimizes—
although hardly removes—the arbitrariness of quantifying inherently qualitative data.  Readers 
should find the likelihoods we assign under the hypothesis that fits best (ranging from 3%–60%) 
to be reasonable.  And the analogy to sound levels helps make assessments of likelihood ratios as 
consistent and intuitive as possible.  Together, these two factors uniquely determine likelihoods 
under rival hypotheses that would otherwise be extremely difficult to reliably quantify.  In our 
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experience, the formalization exercise would have been intractable and fraught with 
inconsistencies had we not devised the procedure outlined above.  A final critical point is that the 
primary objective in social science should be comparing hypotheses, rather than calculating 
posteriors, in which case only the likelihood ratios matter—not the absolute value of the 
probabilities.  For readers whose skepticism persists, we assess how our conclusions would 
change if we were to compress our likelihood ratios—increasing our lowest probabilities by a 
factor of 50—in the last section of this appendix.  
Assessing probabilities conditional on previously-incorporated evidence presents additional 
challenges, as discussed in Section 3.5.  This task entails asking whether Ex and Eprev have any 
logical dependence under the assumption that Hj is true: what do we learn about the likelihood of 
Ex from observing Eprev?  Beyond what Hj tells us, if we also know Eprev, are we any more or less 
likely to observe Ex, and by how much?  Answering these questions can be very difficult.  
Evidence can be connected in arbitrarily complex ways that make tracing through possible 
logical and/or causal connections a complicated task.  It could even be the case that two pieces of 
evidence Ex and Ey are dependent in multiple ways, some of which might lead us to raise  
P(Ex |Hj Ey) above P(Ex |Hj), whereas others might lead us to lower P(Ex |Hj Ey).  When the data 
are qualitative, quantifying potentially competing effects from different linkages may be 
practically impossible.  Even in the relatively simple example we examine here, we managed to 
explicitly condition on only those pieces of evidence that are most clearly dependent under a 
given hypothesis.    
The background information, upon which all probability assignments are also conditioned, 
draws on extensive fieldwork in Chile that included 216 interviews, research in news and 
congressional archives, and observation of congressional proceedings, conferences, and public 
events relevant to tax policy.  The background information includes knowledge about effort 
expended to uncover relevant evidence, persistence in seeking to obtain interviews, relative ease 
or difficulty of reaching particular types of informants, skill at establishing rapport with and 
degree of trust in informants, first-hand knowledge about Chilean politics, and a wide range of 
contextual clues that inform interpretation of interviews and other evidence.  We also take the 
particular set of informants interviewed as part of the background information, to avoid 
reasoning about the probability of reaching a specific individual or type of informant when 
assessing likelihoods.  For example, E2 includes a statement made by former president Lagos; we 
condition the likelihood of E2 on the background information that Fairfield was able to interview 
Lagos on multiple occasions.  Otherwise, we would have to lower the likelihood of E2 under 
each hypothesis.  We explicitly discuss specific elements of the background information that 
inform likelihood assignments as needed.  However, much of the background information 
inevitably remains implicit; in practice it would be impossible to fully enumerate.   
It is also important to note that although E1–E6 mention very specific pieces of evidence 
obtained during fieldwork, the conditional probabilities we assign below correspond to any 
informationally-equivalent piece of evidence that might have arisen.  For example,  
P(E6|HEA Eprev I) refers to the likelihood of a particular right-party deputy interviewed on 
December 23, 2005 sharing the exact comments reported, or to any other essentially equivalent 
story shared by a similar informant from that party, using slightly different language, on a 
different day, and so forth.  This point may seem like a technicality, but the probability of 
observing the exact piece of evidence E6 would otherwise be vanishingly small given the myriad 
contingencies that ultimately produced that specific conversation.  Moreover, irrelevant details 
associated with a narrowly-defined piece of evidence would be common under each alternative 
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hypothesis—they would simply lower the conditional probability of the evidence under every 
hypothesis, such that their effect would cancel out of the likelihood ratios.   
 In general, defining the equivalence class entails optimizing a tradeoff between generality 
and specificity.  If the equivalence class is too broad and vague, we may risk circularity by 
essentially asserting that “the evidence is that there was evidence in favor of the hypothesis,” and 
there will be little basis for assessing likelihoods.  If the equivalence class becomes too narrow 
and specific, with too many irrelevant details, the likelihoods will become vanishingly small and 
hence difficult to assess, since our brains are not well adapted for reasoning about small 
probabilities.  The set of hypotheses under consideration will also guide decisions about how 
narrowly or broadly to define the equivalence class for the sake of effectively discriminating 
among the explanations.  
In most cases below, the equivalence class is implicitly defined by the details that are 
omitted in stating the evidence.  For example, if a quote is attributed to an informant of a 
particular type, a similar statement from an alternative informant of that same type would be 
assigned the same probability.  
We now proceed to assess likelihoods for the six different pieces of evidence given the 
alternative hypotheses.  In assigning each probability, we draw on the considerations discussed 
above, including background information and logical dependence or independence of evidence. 
We also pay close attention to potential instrumental incentives and/or unmotivated biases that 
could affect a source’s inclination to make particular statements and/or disposition to reveal or 
conceal information. 
 
E1 = The governing center-left coalition discussed eliminating 57 bis in multiple 
prior tax reforms (1990, 1995, 1998, 2001) (E1a).  However, governing-coalition 
informants explained that the initiative was ultimately ruled out as infeasible on 
every such occasion due to resistance from the right (E1b).   
(E1a sources: Diario de Sesiones del Senado, Legislatura 331, Sesión 14, July 6, 1995: 37, and 
338, Sesión 13, July 7, 1998: 64; interviews: Aninat, Montes, and all E1b interviews.  
E1b sources (interviews): Bitar, Executive Advisor A, Eyzaguirre, Ffrench-Davis, Finance 
Ministry-A, -B, -H, Jorratt, Marcel, Marfán)   
 
We have endeavored to describe E1 in terms that convey an appropriate and manageable 
equivalence class.  What matters most for discriminating among our alternative hypotheses is the 
existence of multiple prior discussions about eliminating the tax benefit, not the details regarding 
how many times it was considered or in which years.  Had we considered these details as central 
to the definition of E1, the likelihoods would become orders of magnitude smaller, and much 
more difficult to assess—the chances that discussion would take place in each of these particular 
years under any of the hypotheses is very, very low.  Even if we take as part of the background 
information that tax reforms were enacted in these years, discussions of 57 bis could easily have 
occurred in some but not all of these years, or in other years when additional reforms were 
proposed.  We include these details parenthetically, along with several of the sources of the 
information, to illustrate the concrete specifics of the data uncovered.27  
Notice also that for convenience, we have taken E1 to be the conjunction of two pieces of 
information E1a and E1b.  We could assess E1a and E1b separately as distinct pieces of evidence; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27Case narratives also include extensive details that go beyond the relevant equivalence class; this allows readers to 
assess alternative hypotheses the author knows to be patently inconsistent and hence does not explicitly consider.  
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we could even disaggregate further so that each of the sources noted above contributes one or 
more pieces of evidence to be considered separately.  However, there would be few analytical 
gains.  When we are dealing with qualitative data, we need to operate at a level that facilitates 
reasoning, rather than trying to build up systematically from extremely specific bits of evidence.  
If we disaggregate too finely and if we make too many analytical steps explicit, we will become 
lost in minutia.  The mathematics of Bayesian analysis allows us to aggregate or disaggregate 
data at whatever level is convenient.   
 
P(E1|HEA I) =  20%    
This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that Lagos’ high-profile equity appeal in the 
unusual context of electoral competition from the right on the issue of inequality explains the 
right’s acceptance of the 2005 reform, since some new factor that was not present in previous 
years must have changed the right’s behavior.   
The probability of observing E1 will depend on how likely we think it is under the equity-appeal 
hypothesis that: 1) center-left governments would consider eliminating 57 bis on multiple prior 
occasions, 2) evidence of such discussions would be uncovered, given that they may or may not 
have taken place publicly, 3) the right would have resisted the initiative on all such occasions, 
and 4) governing-coalition informants would attribute their decision not to push forward with the 
initiative to resistance from the right.  Regarding the first proposition, we take as background 
information that center-left governments were interested in raising revenue and eliminating tax 
privileges for the wealthy; however, eliminating 57 bis may not have been discussed at all if 
other issues had higher priority on the reform agenda.  In contrast, we view propositions 2), 3) 
and 4) as highly probable.  Regarding 2), we judge the probability of discovering evidence if 
prior initiatives were discussed to be high, drawing on the (logically prior) background 
information that Fairfield obtained extensive access to finance ministry informants who shared 
ample information about policy deliberations that was not part of the public record.  For 
proposition 3), we view the probability of right resistance as very high given background 
information from prior research (Luna 2014) and from Fairfield’s research on other tax reforms 
in Chile that the right generally opposed increasing taxes and eliminating tax benefits on 
principle.  Strictly speaking, by treating this information as background, it should also inform our 
priors on the hypotheses. Specifically, this information would lower the prior probability on HMV 
(and possibly HI as well).  However, we will nevertheless consider priors that do not penalize 
HMV relative to other hypotheses for the sake of being conservative, and for the sake of 
highlighting the impact of the six pieces of evidence from the case study.  Regarding proposition 
4), given that the right held a majority in the senate during this period, we see no reason under 
HEA that center-left informants would not identify right resistance as a major impediment to 
reform.   
Ultimately, we somewhat arbitrarily assign P(E1|HEA) a value of 20%, in light of the possibility 
that any number of other progressive reform initiatives could have been prioritized in the past.  
In reality, this probability may be overestimated; however, recall that for the purpose of 
comparing hypotheses, only the relative likelihoods under the four hypotheses will matter. 
 
P(E1|HI I) = .02%     
If stable institutions produced consensus on eliminating 57 bis in 2005, they should have 
produced consensus on this initiative in previous years as well, since our background information 
includes the fact that institutions did not change during the intervening time period.  If 
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eliminating the tax benefit had been discussed and ruled out on only one occasion, one might 
reason that E1 was a fluke in which some other factor counteracted the usual effect of 
institutions.  However, the probability of observing the conjunction of multiple prior instances in 
which institutions did not promote right party cooperation is very low under HI.   
It is possible that 57 bis was ruled out for some reason other than right resistance, for example, 
internal dissent within the governing coalition, but that informants nevertheless blamed the right 
for instrumental reasons.  Drawing on the following elements of our background information, we 
view the possibility that internal dissent was more important than right resistance as highly 
unlikely: 1) we have a high level of confidence in the informants’ knowledge and judgment, 2) 
similar analysis was provided by multiple informants across different governments and different 
government positions (tax agency, finance ministry, congress, presidency), making the 
possibility of collusion on a false story less likely, 3) informants who indicated that right 
resistance had precluded eliminating 57 bis also noted that internal dissent had been a problem 
for other tax issues, which suggests that had internal dissent been relevant for 57 bis, they would 
have divulged that information, 4) over this period, the right opposed tax increases on principle 
and defended tax benefits such as 57 bis as “acquired property rights.”  We therefore set this 
probability three orders of magnitude (30 dB) lower than under HEA.   
 
P(E1|HP I) = 10%   
E1 is more or less consistent with the hypothesis that business preferences changed over time.  
The right may have resisted prior reform initiatives because its core business constituency valued 
57 bis, whereas this tax benefit no longer mattered to the core constituency in 2005.  However, 
given that we know the right tended to resist tax increases on principle, we assign a likelihood 
for E1 under HP that is slightly lower (3 dB) than under HEA.  
 
P(E1|HMV I) = 0.02%    
We judge the probability of observing E1, if the right were in the practice of catering to the 
median voter’s interests on redistributive issues (following a simple median voter logic where 
neither preferences nor issue awareness is problematized), to be roughly the same as the 
probability of observing E1 under HI.  Under HMV, the right should not have consistently resisted 
eliminating 57 bis on every occasion when the issue arose prior to 2005.  As discussed under 
P(E1|HI I), center-left governments might have incentives to blame the right if some other 
problem had precluded reform, but we view that possibility as unlikely.    
 
While EI does not discriminate very much between HEA and HP, this evidence does cast 
significant doubt on the institutional hypothesis HI and on the median voter hypothesis HMV.  The 
weight of evidence in favor of HEA compared to either of these two alternatives is 30 decibels.  
Note that in specifying EIa, we have taken the information that center-left governments 
considered eliminating 57 bis on multiple prior occasions as fact ( =Xa), whereas E1b involves 
hearing government informants assert that resistance from the right was the reason that the 
initiative was judged infeasible ( =E(Xb)).  We can treat Xa as factual rather than assessing 
evidence E(Xa) that various informants and documents made statements to that effect because we 
are in a special case where 1) we believe that the accuracy of this information is very high 
(nearly certain) across all four hypotheses, P(~Xa |E(Xa) Hi I)~0, given that multiple different 
sources, including interviews and congressional documents, provided corroborating accounts, 
and 2) incentives for the sources to reveal Xa conditional on Xa being true do not vary across our 
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four hypotheses (see Appendix 2).   
Similar arguments could be used to justify replacing E(Xb) with Xb ( = reform was 
infeasible due to right resistance) in our analysis, since we have essentially argued above that 
P(~Xb |E(Xb) Hi I) is negligibly small under the two hypotheses HI and HMV which might create 
incentives for falsely blaming the right.  However, we prefer to incorporate our judgments of 
informants’ incentives under a given hypothesis and our evaluations of their reliability into our 
assessments of P(E1|Hi I) = P(E1a E1b| Hi I) = P(Xa E(Xb)|Hi I) for consistency with how we treat 
subsequent pieces of evidence such as E2, which involves similar informants commenting on the 
politics of the 2005 reform.  
 
E2 = A finance ministry official observed that 57 bis “was a pure transfer of 
resources to rich people; there was no way to argue differently.  It was not 
possible for the right to oppose the reform after making that argument about 
inequality,” (interview: Finance Ministry-b, Oct 13, 2005).  Likewise, former 
president Lagos (interview, Sept 20, 2006) maintained: “57 bis never would have 
been eliminated if I had not taken Lavín at his word”— i.e., if Lagos had not 
taken seriously Lavín’s publicly-professed concern over inequality and issued an 
equity-appeal challenge. 
  
We treat these two statements as a single piece of evidence: regardless of which hypothesis 
is correct, we expect that the president and finance ministry officials have communicated 
extensively and share similar analyses of why the right accepted the reform.  In other words, 
these two statements are strongly (although not completely) dependent under any hypothesis.  
Recall as well that we are free to aggregate or disaggregate evidence as we see fit to facilitate 
probability assignments, as long as we ultimately take all of the relevant evidence into account.  
It is also worth noting that Fairfield’s research uncovered similar statements by additional Lagos 
administration informants.  For example, a presidential advisor asserted that “the right was 
trapped in its discourse and had to cede,” (interview, Oct. 21, 2005).  This evidence further 
corroborates the statements in E2, but we consider it highly dependent on E2 and therefore view it 
as adding little additional inferential weight.  
Note that in E2 we refer to a finance ministry official rather than the specific individual 
interviewed to denote the relevant equivalence class—similar information conveyed by another 
knowledgeable member of the finance ministry team would be essentially equivalent in its 
probative value.  However, we do explicitly name former president Lagos, since he is the highest 
relevant authority and is in a class of his own; he is in a unique position to assess the politics 
surrounding the 2005 reform.   
 
P(E2|HEA E1 I) = 60%   
E2 entails fairly direct observations of the mechanism underlying HEA.  The first informant does 
not explicitly mention the equity appeal but is clearly referring to the exchange between Lavín 
and Lagos that culminated in Lagos’ equity appeal with respect to 57 bis. Lagos’ comment is 
likewise clearly a reference to the equity appeal.  Because E2 makes the Lagos administration 
appear savvy and effective at achieving socially-desirable goals while highlighting the right’s 
resistance to redistribution, there should be little reason for the government to conceal this 
information if HEA is in fact true.  The conditional probability P(E2|HEA E1) of observing this 
evidence should therefore be fairly high.  While we would be surprised if we did not obtain 
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evidence from government informants that the equity appeal mattered under HEA, we choose a 
value of 60%, bearing in mind that we have a conjunction of two statements in E2.  
 
P(E2|HI E1 I) = 6%    
If HI is true, government informants might nevertheless have incentives to attribute the right’s 
support for eliminating 57 bis in 2005 to Lagos’ equity appeal, since as elaborated above, this 
story portrays the government in a positive light and the right in a negative light.  However, we 
judge the likelihood of observing E2 to be low under HI, because based on the background 
information, including Fairfield’s additional interviews with these informants, we have a high 
degree of confidence in the informants’ knowledgeability, analytical judgments, and sincerity.  
Balancing these considerations, we take P(E2|HI E1 I) to be ten times (10 dB) lower than 
P(E2|HEA E1 I).  
 
P(E2|HP E1 I) = P(E2|HMV E1 I) = 6%, following a similar logic as for P(E2|HI E1 I).  
 
The weight of evidence for E2 in favor of HEA compared to any of the three alternatives is 
10 decibels, which roughly corresponds to the sound of leaves rustling in the distance, or a pin 
drop.  
Note also E2 provides an example where the accuracy of the information depends on the 
hypothesis under consideration.  Under HEA, the informants’ statements must be taken as true, 
whereas under the alternative hypotheses, the statements must be taken as false—our informants 
are either mistaken or lying.   
 
E3 = A finance ministry informant reported that after the 2001 Anti-Evasion 
reform, the Lagos administration tried to reach an agreement with business to 
eliminate 57 bis on several occasions without success (interview, Finance 
Ministry-b, Oct. 13, 2005).     
 
P(E3|HEA E1-2 I) = 40%     
This evidence is consistent with HEA: some new dynamic, like the equity appeal, was necessary 
for eliminating 57 bis in 2005.  We see few incentives for a finance ministry informant to 
withhold the information in E3; moreover, as part of our background information, we know that 
Fairfield achieved strong rapport with finance ministry informants.  Nevertheless, additional 
evidence of unsuccessful prior efforts at eliminating 57 bis under HEA is not very surprising in 
light of E1, so we assign a higher probability for P(E3|HEA E1-2) compared to P(E1|HEA).   
We keep the value below 0.5 because it is also plausible that the government may not have 
bothered trying to eliminate 57 bis again in light of the prior difficulties.  
 
P(E3|HI E1-2 I) =  0.1%        
If stable institutions alone created consensus with the right on eliminating 57 bis in 2005, we 
would not expect to see the Lagos administration trying to negotiate the reform directly with 
business a couple years earlier.  Nor can we think of any reasonable instrumental incentive for a 
finance ministry informant to invent this episode or “misremember” something that did not 
happen if HI holds, although there might be some incentive to exaggerate the number of efforts 
undertaken to eliminate 57 bis for the sake of emphasizing the government’s commitment to 
progressive reforms.  We set this probability 400 times (26 dB) lower than P(E3|HEA, E1-2), but 
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higher than P(E1|HI) for two reasons.  First, E3 does not contradict HI as directly as E1, since the 
right was not involved in the E3 negotiations.  Second, E3 and E1 may still have some 
dependence under HI, thereby making us less surprised to observe E3 in light of E1.  If HI is true, 
E1 must be viewed as a bizarre fluke (however improbable under HI), such that if the government 
had approached the right about eliminating 57 bis once again, institutions would indeed have 
compelled the right to accept the reform.  However, the experience of E1 may nevertheless have 
led the government to doubt that right politicians would behave differently, motivating the 
administration to approach business instead.       
 
P(E3|HP E1-2 I) = 0.04%       
If the right’s core constituency no longer valued 57 bis (HP), the government should have been 
able to negotiate its elimination in direct talks with business.  It is very unlikely that a major shift 
in the structure of assets occurred during the second half of the Lagos administration such that 
business changed its position on 57 bis within the timespan of just a couple years.28  We 
therefore set this probability three orders of magnitude (30 dB) smaller than P(E3|HEA E1-2).  This 
probability ends up slightly higher than the lowest probabilities we have assigned so far—0.02% 
for P(E1|HI, MV).  We view this difference as reasonable, since some other issue could 
conceivably have hurt government-business relations and caused negotiations to fall apart even if 
business did not care about 57 bis any more (HP), whereas it is much more difficult to rationalize 
repeated resistance from the right under HI or HMV.  And again, E3 and E1 may be slightly 
dependent for the same reasons discussed under P(E3|HI E1-2) above.   
Whereas previous evidence has been reasonably consistent with the preference change 
hypothesis, we now have strong evidence against HP.  The weight of evidence E3 favors HEA by 
30 decibels.  
  
P(E3|HMV E1-2 I) = 0.1%      
If the right caters to the median voter’s material interests (HMV), then it would support 
eliminating 57 bis, and there would be no reason for the government to attempt negotiating the 
tax reform directly with business.  We set this probability equal to 0.1% for similar reasons as 
discussed for P(E3|HI E1-2) above.     
 
E4 = A technical advisor to the right party’s congressional bloc commented: “The 
government said we have to eliminate 57 bis and I said that is a mistake, and they 
[the right legislators] said ‘no, we will lose votes if we don’t approve it.’” 
(Interview, Instituto Libertad y Desarrollo, Santiago, Chile, Nov. 25, 2005) 
 
P(E4|HEA E1-3 I) =  50%   
This probability depends on how likely we think it is that a technical advisor would reveal such 
information if the equity appeal in the context of a major electoral campaign and high issue 
salience did in fact motivate the right to accept reform.  We view this probability as fairly high—
a technical advisor who holds strong views on tax policy would have few incentives to hide the 
role of electoral concerns in undermining his or her advice when talking to a foreign academic 
who did not disclose her own political or policy views.  Right-wing economists in Chile as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28Tax agency data show that the amount of deductible income claimed under 57 bis did drop by 20% from 2001 to 
2004; however, we do not consider this shift to be significant enough to drive the change in the right’s position.   
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elsewhere have no shortage of technical arguments in favor of inequitable tax measures and 
actively promote such arguments in the public sphere.  Likewise, right legislators should have 
little incentive to hide or misrepresent their reasons for supporting the 2005 reform in 
conversation with their own partisan technical advisors.    
Notice that the likelihood of E4, P(E4|HEA E1-3 I), is a bit lower than the likelihood of E2 
(statements from government informants on the importance of the equity appeal), P(E2|HEA E1 I).  
We view this rank ordering as reasonable since it is less “instrumental” for a right informant to 
assert E4 (even though there should be few incentives to hide this information) than it is for a 
government informant to assert E2, and because we view E4 as largely independent from E3 and 
E2.  
 
P(E4|HI E1-3 I) = 0.05%    
We judge it highly unlikely that a technical advisor would report that legislators were concerned 
over losing votes if institutions were what mattered for the right’s decision to support the 2005 
reform.  Accordingly, we set this likelihood three orders of magnitude (30 dB) lower than under 
HEA.  One might imagine that right legislators could have some incentive to cultivate a (false) 
image of responsiveness to voters in any situation where the content of conversations could be 
leaked to the public.  However, Fairfield’s background information includes the fact that many 
members of the Chilean political elite eschew “populist” tendencies and openly advocate pursing 
“technically appropriate” policies rather than catering to public opinion on economic issues.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Notice that the weight of evidence E4 in favor of HEA relative to HI is 4 decibels higher than the 
corresponding weight of evidence E3, which is a noticeable difference (Figure A3.1).  This 
makes sense intuitively because E4 is a more direct statement about the mechanism underlying 
HEA and is therefore less consistent with HI. 
 
P(E4|HP E1-3 I) =  0.05%   
Following a similar logic, this probability should be roughly the same as P(E4 |HI E1-3).  
 
P(E4|HMV E1-3 I) =  50%    
The informant is simply reporting concern over votes, which should be as likely if a simple 
median voter logic were at work as it is if the equity appeal in the context of a major campaign 
where inequality had become highly salient were critical for igniting that concern.   
 
Notice that in assessing these likelihoods, we have considered E4 to be essentially 
independent of E1–3.  There may well be some dependence with E2—the government informants’ 
statements about the equity appeal, but since E2 and E4 come from sources on opposite sides of 
the political spectrum and because the statements contain slightly different information, we judge 
the potential dependence to be negligible for our purposes.  More specifically, under HEA, there 
need be no logical or causal dependence, because sources on both sides are simply stating the 
truth, and hearing one account does not appreciably increase or decrease our surprise in hearing a 
similar narrative from the other side.  Under the other hypotheses, both the left and right 
informants somehow came to relate similar incorrect accounts.  Either they were misinformed by 
the same rumors or news accounts, or both jumped to similar reasonable, if erroneous, 
conclusions.  We judge the latter scenario most likely under ~HEA, so we consider any 
probabilistic dependence to be small. 
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E5 = Lavín’s advisors attributed Lagos’s narrow victory in the 1999 presidential 
election to the right’s rejection of a labor-rights bill that the center-left 
government sent to congress during the campaign.  Lavín’s advisors compared 
the 2005 bill eliminating 57 bis to that 1999 labor bill and commented: “The 
center-right is not willing to fall into the 1999 trap again.” (El Mercurio, May 13, 
2005.  Two additional articles from the same newspaper, which is widely 
recognized as having strong ties to business and the right, referred to similar 
points regarding the right’s comparison of the 1999 bill and the 2005 bill. (El 
Mercurio, May 12, 2005; El Mercurio, June 15, 2005)   
 
It is convenient to treat E5 as a single piece of evidence because the existence of the second 
and third articles is strongly dependent on the first.  The May 12 and May 13 articles in 
particular should be considered highly correlated, meaning that the probability of observing both 
does not differ much from the probability of seeing the first.  Although the authors are different, 
it is hardly surprising to see a follow up article in the same newspaper articulating similar points 
regarding the same policy issue.  The June 15 article includes some distinct sources of 
information and can therefore be considered less correlated with the previous articles and hence 
providing more independent corroboration, but regardless of which hypothesis we are evaluating, 
this third article is less surprising following the appearance of the prior articles. The earlier 
articles may well have helped to publicly disseminate a particular perspective among readers and 
subsequent commentators.        
 
P(E5|HEA E1-4 I) =  3%  
This evidence, which stresses the timing of the reform, the difficult position it created for the 
right, and anticipated electoral costs—is consistent with the hypothesized mechanism underlying 
HEA, although it does not explicitly refer to Lagos’ equity appeal.  However, we judge the 
conditional probability of observing E5 to be low because it is unlikely that sources on the right 
would openly admit that the government’s strategy put them in a tight place—E5 strikes us as 
quite embarrassing.  We set this probability a bit lower than the likelihood of hearing Lagos 
administration informants instrumentally or mistakenly emphasize the importance of the equity 
appeal under a hypothesis where the equity appeal did not matter—we are more surprised to find 
the right admitting E5 in the press than we would be to learn that the government informants 
were being instrumental or mistaken in their analysis. 
 
P(E5|HI E1-4 I) = 0.003%     
Observing E5 if HI holds is much less likely than under HEA.  If institutions motivated the right’s 
decision on 57 bis in 2005, there would be no instrumental reason for the right to state that it felt 
trapped and anticipated electoral costs to rejecting the reform.  We set this likelihood three orders 
of magnitude (30 dB) less than P(E5|HEA E1-4), and slightly lower than P(E4|HI E1-3) since E5 
seems much more embarrassing than E4.  
 
P(E5|HP E1-4 I) =  0.003%    
E5 is also highly implausible if what really mattered for the right’s decision on 57 bis in 2005 
were changing preferences among its core constituency (HP).  If HP holds, we would expect a 
right informant to state that 57 bis was simply not an important tax benefit.   
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P(E5|HMV E1-4 I) =  0.03%     
E5 implies that the right had voted against public opinion in the past and was punished by voters 
(according to the right’s own reported interpretation).  Under HMV, we might still except to see 
prior deviations from the median voter’s material interests leading to punishment at the polls and 
subsequently reinforcing responsiveness to the median voter, and E5 is consistent with that type 
of learning mechanism.  However, we would not expect the right to publicly announce that it had 
fallen into a trap in 1999.  In addition, the emphasis on timing in E5 suggests that outside of 
presidential campaigns, the right would not have feared electoral punishment for deviating from 
the median voter’s material interest.  Given these considerations, we judge the probability of E5 
under HMV to be two orders of magnitude lower than under HEA.  This probability assignment 
yields a weight of evidence of 20 decibels in favor of the equity appeal hypothesis, roughly 
equivalent to the difference between a normal conversation and an alarm clock.  
 
Note that under any of our hypotheses, E5 and E4 could have some dependence, since the 
newspaper stories could conceivably have influenced right informants’ perceptions or memories.  
However, observing E5 under any hypothesis seems much more surprising than E4, so we view 
any potential dependency between E4 and E5 as having little meaningful upward effect on the 
likelihoods of E5.  Any conditioning on E4 will only have an effect at the margins.    
              
E6 = When asked about the 2005 reform, a right-party deputy with long-term 
experience on the congressional finance committee and intimate knowledge of the 
party’s internal decision-making processes commented: “Our candidate made a 
commitment, and it was also a difficult moment for him. Therefore the political 
decision was made to support what the candidate said; we had to take maximum 
safeguards so that it would not be a disaster... the opposition demonstrated that 
this time it would accept things that usually it was not disposed to accept so as not 
to harm the presidential option—in this case it would do something popular.” 
(Interview: UDI, Dec. 23, 2005)29 
 
P(E6|HEA E1-5 I) = 5%    
E6 evidences the causal mechanism underlying HEA—prior pieces of evidence have only 
illustrated parts of this causal mechanisms in action.  According to the informant, the right was 
concerned that its presidential candidate would lose votes if right-party legislators defended 57 
bis, and that concern drove the right to deviate from the decision it otherwise would have made 
on the measure.  Given the reasonable assumption that average citizens would not have been 
familiar with, or at least would not have been thinking about 57 bis—an obscure tax benefit for 
wealthy stockowners—prior to the exchange between Lavín and Lagos, we can infer that Lagos’ 
equity appeal drove the right’s manifest concern over public opinion, even though the informant 
does not explicitly refer to that appeal.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29Note that this evidence is very similar in structure to the “smoking gun” evidence that Bennett (2015: 279) 
highlights in his discussion of Tannenwald’s (2007) research: a decision-maker who disagreed with the policy 
decision (in Tannenwald’s case, non-use of nuclear weapons; in Fairfield’s case, elimination of 57 bis) essentially 
articulates the author’s hypothesized explanation for why that decision was made (Tannenwald: normative 
constraints; Fairfield: well-timed equity appeal).    
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The probability of observing E6 again depends on whether we think such a right informant would 
admit concern over votes in this manner if HEA holds.  On the one hand, we have already 
observed other right sources providing similar evidence (E5), and rapport with informants is part 
of our background information.  Nevertheless, we judge the probability of observing E6 to be 
low, because E6 is surprisingly candid and much more explicit than E5, in a manner that runs 
against the expected direction of instrumental bias.  It seems strategically disadvantageous and 
embarrassing for a right party deputy to state that the government succeeded in driving his party 
to do something it otherwise would not have done, and to acknowledge that the party did not 
share Lavín’s purported enthusiasm for eliminating the tax benefit to promote equity.  For the 
same reason, we view the informant’s statement as sincere.  An instrumental response would 
have instead entailed no comment, or a denial that the government’s strategy mattered, or 
agreement with the government’s rationale for reform, in line with Lavín’s public statement 
following Lagos’ equity challenge (see E7 below).  Overall, these considerations lead us to assign 
a low probability for P(E6|HEA E1-5), which we set to 5%, slightly higher than P(E5|HEA E1-4) 
because having heard E5 we are a bit less surprised to hear another right informant admitting 
similarly embarrassing points. 
 
P(E6|HI E1-5 I) = 0.005%       
We judge it far less likely that a right informant would spell out the mechanism underlying HEA 
if alternative hypothesis HI holds instead.  The informant did not simply say that the right agreed 
to eliminate 57 bis because public opinion supported the reform, a plausible instrumental, 
socially desirable response that could make the right appear democratic and responsive to the 
majority interest.  Instead, the informant indicated that the right was in a tough spot and felt 
pressured by public opinion against its will to support a reform it did not like.  If institutions and 
consensual politics (HI) were what really motivated the right to accept reform, we would not 
expect an informant to tell a potentially embarrassing story about feeling forced to do something 
it did not want to do for the sake of protecting its candidate’s electoral prospects.  We assign 
P(E6|HI E1-5) a value of 0.005%, three orders of magnitude (30 dB) smaller than P(E6|HEA E1-5), 
but a bit higher than P(E5|HI E1-4) since there is some potential dependence between E6 and E5—
we are less surprised to see E6 given that we have already observed E5.  We do not boost the 
probability very much, however, because a scenario where HI is true but an incorrect story about 
why the right accepted the 2005 reform emerged in the press (E5) and then diffused among the 
right remains highly unlikely.   
 
P(E6|HP E1-5 I) =  0.005%    
Our rationale follows that described above for P(E6|HP E1-5).  We view E6 to be highly 
implausible if what really mattered for the right’s 2005 decision on 57 bis were changing 
preferences among its core constituency (HP).  If HP holds, we would expect a right informant to 
state that 57 bis was simply not an important tax benefit.    
 
P(E6|HMV E1-5 I) =  0.006%    
While the electoral logic in the informant’s statement does not contradict a simple median voter 
model (HMV), the clear implication that the right would not have accepted the reform if its 
presidential candidate had not been in a tight place indicates that responsiveness to public 
opinion on this issue was a deviation from the right’s usual behavior on taxation and 
redistribution.  However, this evidence is certainly more consistent with a median voter 
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hypothesis compared to HI or HP, which act through non-electoral mechanisms.  We therefore set 
P(E6|HMV E1-5 I) slightly higher than the conditional probability under HI and HP.  
 
Note that E6 is essentially a smoking gun for HEA—the likelihood is fairly low under this 
hypothesis, but the weight of evidence in favor of HEA compared to each of the three alternatives 
is high—29 decibels relative to HMV and 30 decibels relative to HP and HI.  
 
Consider finally the following observation for pedagogical purposes: 
 
E7 = A right party deputy responded when asked about the 2005 reform that 
Lavín agreed with Lagos’ proposal and the right therefore supported the initiative 
in congress. (interview: Dittborn, 2005)     
 
Intuitively, this piece of evidence is not informative—the probability of observing E7 should be 
very similar under each of the four hypotheses, perhaps around 0.5.  This statement is what we 
would expect to hear from the right—not admitting any internal discontent with Lavín’s 
declaration.  If HEA holds, we would not be very surprised to hear E7 because it is instrumentally 
preferable for the right not to acknowledge that the Lagos administration’s strategy forced the 
opposition to do something it preferred not to do.  If the institutional hypothesis HI holds, E7 is 
not very surprising because the right is portraying the reform as consensual and non-
controversial.  E7 is consistent with HP and HMV as well, since either changing preferences among 
business or a simple median voter logic could explain this informant’s assertion that the right 
was willing to go along with Lavín’s support for eliminating 57 bis.  Of course, we would need 
to condition the likelihood of observing E7 on each of the prior pieces of evidence E1-6; however, 
we could obviate this complication by incorporating this piece of evidence first (as E0 instead of 
E7).  This statement therefore does little to help discriminate between the four hypotheses and is 
not relevant for the causal analysis.  Fairfield (2013) accordingly does not discuss this piece of 
evidence.   
 
Figure A3.1 summarizes our conditional probability assignments for each piece of evidence 
E1–E6 (summarized in Table A3.1).  The figure displays the weight of evidence in favor of the 
equity appeal hypothesis relative to each alternative hypothesis.  The larger the weight of 
evidence, the more probative value the piece of evidence provides against the alternative 
hypothesis in question.       
A few differences are worth highlighting between our Bayesian analysis and the original 
process-tracing tests appendix (Fairfield 2013) regarding the probative value of discreet pieces of 
evidence.  Figure A3.1 indicates that E2 (government informants on the equity appeal) is the least 
probative piece of evidence, whereas the process-tracing tests appendix took that information to 
be strongly supportive of HEA, although that evidence was correctly identified as less decisive 
than similar statements from the right (E4-6).  And whereas the process-tracing tests appendix 
viewed E1 and E3 as only weakly supporting HEA, our Bayesian analysis assigns a strong weight 
of evidence to these pieces of information relative to the alternative hypotheses we consider here: 
25–30 dB (with the exception that E1 does not discriminate much between HP and HEA).  The 
lesson is that explicitly elaborating alternative hypotheses, rather than attempting to assess a 
hypothesis (the equity appeal had an effect) against its negation (it had no effect), can help us 
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better assess the probative value of our evidence.  This is one illustration of why Bayesian 
analysis is preferable to the process-tracing tests approach. 
 
Figure A3.1:  Weight of Evidence (dB), E1–E6  𝑊!" = 10 log!" 𝑃(𝐸!|𝐻!"   𝐸!"#$"   𝐼) ∕ 𝑃(𝐸!|𝐻!"#   𝐸!"#$"   𝐼)   ,   𝐻!"# = 𝐻! ,𝐻! , 𝑜𝑟  𝐻!"    
 
 
Table A3.1: Summary of Evidence 
 
E1  Reform previously discussed by center-left but ruled out given right resistance 
E2  Government informants on equity appeal 
E3  Failed previous government efforts to reach agreement with business 
E4  Right technical advisor on concern over votes 
E5  Right-candidate advisors on the reform proposal as a “trap” 
E6  Right party deputy on reluctantly accepting reform to protect “presidential option” 
 
   
A3.4 Updating Probabilities in Light of the Evidence 
We can now apply Bayes’ theorem to calculate posterior probabilities for the hypotheses in 
light of the evidence:   
 𝑃 𝐻! 𝐸  𝐼) = 𝑃 𝐻!   𝐼)  𝑃(𝐸|𝐻!   𝐼)𝑃 𝐸|  𝐼 = 𝑃 𝐻!   𝐼)  𝑃(𝐸|𝐻!   𝐼)  ∑𝑃 𝐻!|  𝐼 𝑃(𝐸|𝐻!  𝐼)     ,                                                                                                                                        (𝐴3.1)  
 
E represents the conjunction of all six pieces of evidence E1–6, and the sum in the denominator 
runs over all four hypotheses.  Recall that we are treating H1–H4 as mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive; this assumption is taken as part of the background information I.  Expanding the 
denominator and suppressing the background information I to save space, we have:   
 𝑃 𝐻! 𝐸 = 𝑃(𝐻!)  𝑃(𝐸|𝐻!)𝑃 𝐻!"   𝑃 𝐸|𝐻!" + 𝑃 𝐻!   𝑃 𝐸 𝐻! + 𝑃 𝐻!   𝑃 𝐸 𝐻! + 𝑃 𝐻!" 𝑃(𝐸|𝐻!")     ,                  (𝐴3.2)   
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where  
 𝑃 𝐸 𝐻 = 𝑃 𝐸6 𝐻  𝐸1–5   𝑃 𝐸5 𝐻  𝐸1–4   𝑃 𝐸4 𝐻  𝐸1–3 𝑃 𝐸3 𝐻  𝐸1–2 𝐸2 𝐻  𝐸1   𝑃 𝐸!   𝐻     ,                            (𝐴3.3)     
 
because we can always break down the joint probability of some composite evidence E = Ea b as 
follows: P(Ea Eb|H) = P(Eb |H Ea) P(Ea |H), in other words, the likelihood of all the evidence is 
the probability of one piece of evidence Ea conditional on the hypothesis and on the rest of the 
evidence, Eb. 
The charts below illustrate how the probabilities for the hypotheses change after each piece 
of evidence is considered across the three scenarios corresponding to different priors on the 
hypotheses (Figure A3.2).  In each scenario, the posterior probability on HEA reaches near 
certainty, while the probability on the closest competing hypothesis falls to at most 10–7 (Table 
A3.2).  Starting from the most unfavorable prior on Fairfield’s explanation—0.0003% in 
Scenario 3 corresponding to the skeptical reviewer—our confidence in HEA increases to 97% 
after incorporating only the first four pieces of evidence.30  The log-scale charts illustrate how 
subsequent pieces of evidence cast more and more doubt on the alternative explanations, 
reducing their posterior probabilities by additional orders of magnitude.   
 
Table A3.2  
 
a) Prior and Posterior Probabilities on the Hypotheses 
 
 Scenario 1:  
Ignorance 
Scenario 2:  
Median-Voter Irrelevance 
Scenario 3:  
Skeptical Reviewer 
 Prior Posterior Prior Posterior  Prior Posterior 
HEA  25% 1.0 33.3% 1.0 0.0003% 1.0 
HI  25% 2.5 E–16 33.3% 2.5 E–16 33.3% 2.8 E–11 
HP  25% 5.0 E–14 33.3% 5.0 E–14 33.3% 5.6 E–9 
HMV  25% 3.0 E–12 0.001% 9.0 E–17 33.3% 3.3 E–7  
 
 
b) Prior and Posterior Odds Ratios for HEA Relative to Rivals (in decibels)  
 
 Scenario 1:  
Ignorance 
Scenario 2:  
Median-Voter Irrelevance 
Scenario 3:  
Skeptical Reviewer 
 Prior Posterior Prior Posterior  Prior Posterior 
HEA : HI  0 156 0 156 –50 106 
HEA : HP  0 133 0  133 –50  83 
HEA : HMV  0 115 45 160 –50  65  
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30If we were to lower the prior on HEA by another order of magnitude, our confidence in HEA would still reach 99.7% 
after incorporating the fifth piece of evidence.    
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Figure A3.2: Probabilities of Hypotheses After Incorporating Evidence (E1–E6) 
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A3.5 Reordering the Evidence    
We now carry out our analysis using a different ordering of the six pieces of evidence. This 
exercise provides an important internal consistency check and further illustrates the challenges 
inherent in applying formal Bayesian analysis to qualitative research.   
The rules of conditional probability demand that the order in which evidence is 
incorporated in Bayesian analysis does not affect the final posterior probabilities on the 
hypotheses (Section 3.5).  When attempting to quantify inherently qualitative data, however, we 
cannot expect to exactly reproduce our results—there is too much arbitrariness inherent in 
assigning numerical values to the likelihoods P(Ex |Hi Eprior I).  On our first pass, we ended up 
with significant discrepancies between P(Eʹ′1–6 |Hi I) for the reordered evidence and P(E1–6 |Hi I) 
from the original exercise—several orders of magnitude for some of the alternative hypotheses.  
To redress this problem, we then iteratively adjusted our numerical values for both orderings by 
carefully comparing the probability assigned to each piece of evidence in the new ordering with 
the probability of that respective piece of evidence in the original ordering, and thinking about 
how conditioning on a different body of previously-incorporated evidence should affect the 
relative numerical assignments.  This painstaking procedure achieved consistency for the  
P(E|Hi I) across the two different orderings to within a factor of two (although we would view 
agreement to an order of magnitude as adequate).  
This reordering exercise also provides an opportunity to assess how the sequencing of 
evidence affects the difficulty of conditioning on previously-incorporated evidence.  The most 
noteworthy difference in the new ordering scheme (Table A3.3) is that we place the right-party 
deputy’s elaboration of the mechanism underlying HEA—the most decisive single piece of 
evidence against the three alternative hypotheses—first instead of last, and we move the similar 
but less discriminating statements from Lagos-administration informants to the end.  We initially 
suspected that it would be easier to assess likelihoods when the most decisive pieces of evidence 
come last (as in the original ordering), because those likelihoods would be large regardless of the 
evidence we previously considered.  However, we found conditioning on previous evidence to be 
equally challenging for both sequencings—especially in cases where previous pieces of evidence 
would have to be considered a fluke under the given hypothesis.   
 
Table A3.3: Reordering the Evidence 
 
Sequence 2 Sequence 1 Evidence  
E1ʹ′   E6  Right party deputy on reluctantly accepting reform 
to protect “presidential option” 
E2ʹ′   E4  Right technical advisor on concern over votes  
                   
E3ʹ′   E1  Reform previously discussed by center-left but 
ruled out given right resistance 
E4ʹ′   E3  Failed previous government efforts to reach 
agreement with business 
E5ʹ′   E5  Right-candidate advisors on the reform proposal as 
a “trap” 
E6ʹ′   E2  Government informants on equity appeal 
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We explain below the rationale for our likelihood assignments in the new ordering scheme.  
In practice, we have kept most likelihood ratios roughly the same for each piece of evidence 
across the two sequencing schemes; when conditioning on a different body of prior evidence, we 
generally shift the likelihoods under each hypothesis by a constant factor compared to their 
values in the original ordering.  While there is no reason to expect that likelihood ratios should 
remain the same, this approach simplifies the exercise, and we found no compelling reason to 
alter any of the likelihood ratios.  Readers who do not wish to delve into the details may skip to 
the final section of this appendix.  
 
 
E1ʹ′  = E6 = When asked about the 2005 reform, a right-party deputy with long-term 
experience on the congressional finance committee and intimate knowledge of the 
party’s internal decision-making processes commented: “Our candidate made a 
commitment, and it was also a difficult moment for him. Therefore the political 
decision was made to support what the candidate said; we had to take maximum 
safeguards so that it would not be a disaster... the opposition demonstrated that 
this time it would accept things that usually it was not disposed to accept so as not 
to harm the presidential option—in this case it would do something popular.” 
(Interview: UDI, Dec. 23, 2005) 
  
P(E1ʹ′ |HEA I) = 1%   
E1ʹ′ is the first surprising evidence from the right that we incorporate in this new ordering, 
whereas the similar information reported by right sources in the press (E5) was incorporated 
before this piece of evidence in the original exercise.  We set P(E1ʹ′|HEA I) a factor of three lower 
than P(E5|HEA E1–4 I) because E1ʹ′ is the more candid, more detailed, and hence more surprising 
evidence.  We set P(E1ʹ′|HEA I) a factor of five lower than P(E6|HEA E1–5 I) because in the original 
exercise, we had to condition on E5, which made E6 less surprising that it would otherwise be.  
 
P(E1ʹ′ |HI I) = 0.001%     
Following our discussion of E6 under HI in the original exercise, we assign P(E1ʹ′|HI I) a value 
three orders of magnitude (30 dB) smaller than P(E1ʹ′|HEA I) to convey the much lower 
probability of observing this evidence under the institutional hypothesis.  We set P(E1ʹ′|HI I) a 
factor of five lower than P(E6|HEA E1-5 I) because under the new ordering, this is the first piece of 
evidence we incorporate, whereas in the original ordering we conditioned on prior evidence 
which included similar information reported by right sources in the press (E5). 
   
P(E1ʹ′ |HP I) = 0.001%    
 
P(E1ʹ′ |HMV I) = 0.0012%    
 
Following similar logic to that described for P(E1ʹ′|HI I) above, we set P(E1ʹ′|HP I) and  
P(E1ʹ′|HMV I) five times lower than P(E6|HP E1-5 I) and P(E6|HMV E1-5 I) respectively.  
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E2ʹ′  = E4 = A technical advisor to the right party’s congressional bloc commented: 
“The government said we have to eliminate 57 bis and I said that is a mistake, 
and they [the right legislators] said ‘no, we will lose votes if we don’t approve 
it.’” (Interview, Instituto Libertad y Desarrollo, Santiago, Chile, Nov. 25, 2005) 
 
P(E2ʹ′ |HEA E1ʹ′  I) = 60%   
After observing E1ʹ′, we are not as surprised to find another source on the right corroborating the 
electoral motivation.  Since E2ʹ′ has some dependence on E1ʹ′, we set P(E2ʹ′|HEA, E1ʹ′, I) slightly 
higher than P(E4|HEA E1-3 I) in the original exercise, where we had not yet taken into account the 
UDI deputy’s comments.    
 
P(E2ʹ′ |HI E1ʹ′  I) = 0.06%    
On its own, E2ʹ′ would be as unlikely as E1ʹ′ under HI, but E2ʹ′ and E1ʹ′ have some dependence 
because they contain similar information from informants on the right.  We assign P(E2ʹ′|HI E1ʹ′ I) 
a value that is three orders of magnitude (30 dB) smaller than P(E2ʹ′|HEA E1ʹ′ I) but larger than 
P(E1ʹ′|HI I).  Note that the dependence between E2ʹ′ and E1ʹ′ also raises P(E2ʹ′|HI E1ʹ′ I) above 
P(E4|HI E1-3 I) in the original exercise.   
 
P(E2ʹ′ |HP E1ʹ′  I) = 0.06%   
Following a similar logic, this probability should be basically the same as P(E2ʹ′|HI E1ʹ′ I).  
 
P(E2ʹ′ |HMV E1ʹ′  I) = 60%   
Following the logic discussed in the original sequencing regarding P(E4 |HMV E1-3 I),  
P(E2ʹ′|HMV E1ʹ′ I) should be essentially equal to P(E2ʹ′|HEA E1ʹ′ I).  Given some dependence between 
E2ʹ′ and E1ʹ′, P(E2ʹ′|HMV E1ʹ′ I) is slightly higher than P(E4 |HMV E1-3 I).  Note that under HMV, we 
must view those elements of E1ʹ′ that go beyond a strict median voter logic as a fluke, where the 
informant was either mistaken or lying.  However, the elements of E1ʹ′ that simply express 
concern over votes are consistent with HMV, and those elements do have some degree of 
dependence with E2ʹ′ —we are now hearing another informant on the right indicate concern over 
votes.   
 
E3ʹ′  = E1 = The governing center-left coalition discussed eliminating 57 bis in 
multiple prior tax reforms (1990, 1995, 1998, 2001).  However, governing-
coalition informants explained that the initiative was ultimately ruled out as 
infeasible on every such occasion due to resistance from the right.  (Interviews: 
governing-coalition informants; congressional records)    
 
P(E3ʹ′ |HEA Eʹ′1-2 I) =  20%   
 
P(E3ʹ′ |HI Eʹ′1-2 I) = 0.02%    
 
P(E3ʹ′ |HP Eʹ′1-2 I) = 10%    
 
P(E3ʹ′ |HMV Eʹ′1-2 I) = 0.02%    
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We set these probabilities the same as the respective P(E1|Hi I)’s in the original exercise since we 
view E3ʹ′ as more or less independent from E1ʹ′ and E2ʹ′ under all the hypotheses.  Note that in 
practice, it would be extremely difficult to condition the likelihood of E3ʹ′ on E1ʹ′ and E2ʹ′ under 
any of the alternative hypotheses (HI, HP, HMV), since E1ʹ′ is an extremely rare event under all of 
these hypotheses and E2ʹ′ is also extremely rare under HI and HP.  The question is whether this 
prior evidence makes E3ʹ′ any more or less consistent with the alternative hypotheses, and it is 
very hard to evaluate given that we are in highly improbable situations that make little sense—
we would have to be in a world of bizarre coincidences or massive misunderstandings.  It is 
difficult to even assess whether the prior information would lead us to increase or decrease the 
likelihood of observing E3ʹ′. 
   
E4ʹ′  = E3 = A finance ministry informant reported that after the 2001 Anti-Evasion 
reform, the Lagos administration tried to reach an agreement with business to 
eliminate 57 bis on several occasions without success (interview, Finance 
Ministry-b, 2005).     
 
P(E4ʹ′ |HEA Eʹ′1-3 I) = 40%   
 
P(E4ʹ′ |HI Eʹ′1-3 I) = 0.1%   
 
P(E4ʹ′ |HP Eʹ′1-3 I) = 0.04%   
 
P(E4ʹ′ |HMV Eʹ′1-3 I) = 0.1%   
 
We again set these probabilities equal to the respective P(E3 |Hi E1-2 I)’s in the original exercise 
because the new ordering of the evidence does not introduce any clearly distinct dependencies 
upon which we must condition (E3ʹ′and E4ʹ′ have some dependence, but E3ʹ′ = E1 came before E4ʹ′ = 
E3 in the original exercise as well).  
 
E5ʹ′  = E5 = Lavín’s advisors attributed Lagos’ narrow victory in the 1999 
presidential election to the right’s rejection of a labor-rights bill that the center-
left government sent to congress during the campaign.  Lavín’s advisors 
compared the 2005 bill eliminating 57 bis to that 1999 labor bill and commented: 
“The center-right is not willing to fall into the 1999 trap again.” (El Mercurio, 
May 13, 2005.  Two additional articles from the same newspaper, which is widely 
recognized as having strong ties to business and the right, referred to similar 
points regarding the right’s comparison of the 1999 bill and the 2005 bill. (El 
Mercurio, May 12, 2005; El Mercurio, June 15, 2005)   
 
P(E5ʹ′ |HEA Eʹ′1-4 I) = 15%   
E5ʹ′ is consistent with the hypothesized mechanism underlying HEA, similar to E1ʹ′.  As discussed 
for P(E1ʹ′|HEA I), it is unlikely that sources on the right would openly admit that the government’s 
equity appeal put them in a tight place.  However, given that an UDI deputy already outlined a 
similar rationale (E1ʹ′), it becomes more likely that another source on the right would also admit 
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this logic—stressing the timing of the reform, the difficult position it created for the right, and 
anticipated electoral costs.  Accordingly, we assign a probability of 15%, (roughly) one order of 
magnitude higher than P(E1ʹ′|HEA I).    
 
P(E5ʹ′ |HI Eʹ′1-4 I) = 0.015%   
As with E1ʹ′, observing E5ʹ′ is unlikely if institutions motivated the right’s decision on 57 bis, so 
before conditioning on prior evidence, P(E5ʹ′|HI I) should be about as low as P(E1ʹ′|HI I), which 
we had set to 0.001%.  However, E5ʹ′ should have some dependence on E1ʹ′.  Under HI, these 
stories are not true, but if one of these stories were to circulate, it is less surprising to hear a 
similar story from a different source within the right.  We therefore set P(E5ʹ′|HI Eʹ′1-4 I) equal to 
0.015%, three orders of magnitude (30 dB) lower than P(E5ʹ′|HEA Eʹ′1-4 I) and roughly one order of 
magnitude higher than P(E1ʹ′|HI I).      
 
P(E5ʹ′ |HP Eʹ′1-4 I) = 0.015% following a similar logic as for P(E5ʹ′|HI Eʹ′1-4 I). 
 
P(E5ʹ′ |HMV Eʹ′1-4 I) = 0.15%     
As with E5, E5ʹ′ should be much less likely under HMV than under HEA, but more plausible than 
under HI and HP.  As with the conditional probabilities under HI and HP, we assign a value that 
preserves the likelihood ratio relative to HEA from the original exercise, since we judge this 
evidence equally probative under the new ordering.31    
 
Note that each P(E5ʹ′|Hi Eʹ′1-4 I) is higher (by a factor of 5) than the corresponding P(E5|Hi E1-4 I) 
in the original exercise because of the dependence between E5ʹ′ and E1ʹ′ in this new ordering.  
Under HEA, this dependency arises because we update our expectations regarding how likely 
right informants are to acknowledge (aspects of) the potentially embarrassing causal mechanism, 
whereas under the alternative hypotheses, the dependency arises because a story may have 
circulated even if it is incorrect.  In general, there is no reason to expect that the factor by which 
we increase the likelihood under HEA should be the same as the factor by which we increase the 
likelihoods under the alternative hypotheses in light of the dependencies.  However, we see no 
way to reliably quantify these relative effects and therefore opt for a common factor.    
 
E6ʹ′  = E2 = A finance ministry official observed that 57 bis “was a pure transfer of 
resources to rich people; there was no way to argue differently.  It was not possible for 
the right to oppose the reform after making that argument about inequality,” (interview: 
Finance Ministry-b, 2005).  Likewise, former president Lagos (interview, 2006) 
maintained: “57 bis never would have been eliminated if I had not taken Lavín at his 
word”— i.e., if Lagos had not taken seriously Lavín’s publicly-professed concern over 
inequality and issued an equity-appeal challenge. 
 
P(E6ʹ′ |HEA Eʹ′1-5 I) = 70%   
The probability of uncovering this evidence conditional on HEA alone, P(E6ʹ′|HEA I), should be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31As should be the case, this likelihood is higher than P(E1ʹ′|HMV, I) since E5ʹ′ does not make the right look as bad as 
E1ʹ′, but lower than P(E2ʹ′|HMV, E1ʹ′, I) since E1ʹ′ was a much more median-voter compatible statement from an 
informant on the right.       
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much greater than the probability of hearing sources on the right confess a similar story, for 
example, P(E1ʹ′|HEA I)—which we set to 1%.  As noted before in the original exercise, the 
rationale is that E6ʹ′ makes the government appear savvy and effective at achieving socially-
desirable goals while highlighting the right’s resistance to redistribution.  Moreover, E6ʹ′ is not 
very surprising in light of our similar prior evidence from right sources (E1ʹ′ and E5ʹ′).  We 
therefore set P(E6ʹ′|HEA Eʹ′1-5 I) equal to 70%, slightly higher than P(E2|HEA E1 I), because the new 
ordering entails conditioning on different prior evidence which has some dependence.   
 
P(E6ʹ′ |HI Eʹ′1-5 I) = P(E6ʹ′ |HP Eʹ′1-5 I) = P(E6ʹ′ |HMV Eʹ′1-5 I) = 7%  
As in the original exercise, we set each of these three conditional probabilities ten times lower 
than P(E6ʹ′|HEA Eʹ′1-5 I).  Note that these probabilities are also slightly larger than the 
corresponding P(E2 |Hi E1 I)’s because E6ʹ′ is somewhat dependent on the prior evidence E1ʹ′ and 
E5ʹ′.  As explained above, private communications among the political elite and news articles 
could result in a shared analysis (however incorrect under these alternative hypotheses) regarding 
why the right accepted the reform.    
 
Before continuing, it is instructive to conduct a consistency check across the two orderings 
on the likelihoods involving the right-candidate campaign advisors’ analysis (E5ʹ′ = E5) and the 
right-party deputy’s statement (E1ʹ′ = E6), the two pieces of evidence that are most strongly 
dependent.  Since the joint probability of two propositions A and B can be broken down either as 
P(A B|H) = P(A|H) P(B|H A) or as P(A B|H) = P(B|H) P(A|H B), we have: 
 𝑃 𝐵   𝐻  𝐴)𝑃 𝐴   𝐻  𝐵) = 𝑃 𝐵   𝐻)  𝑃 𝐴|  𝐻     ,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          (𝐴3.4)  
 
Applying this relationship to our two pieces of evidence using the first ordering scheme, we 
have: 
 𝑃 𝐸6     𝐻  𝐸5  𝐸1–4)𝑃 𝐸5     𝐻  𝐸6  𝐸1–4) = 𝑃 𝐸6     𝐻  𝐸1–4)  𝑃 𝐸5  |  𝐻  𝐸1–4     .                                                                                                                                                                                                                        (𝐴3.5)  
 
If we consider E6 to be independent of E1-4, an assumption that we made in practice when 
assigning likelihoods, then we can replace the numerator on the right hand side of (A3.5) with 
P(E1ʹ′|H).  If we also take the right campaign advisors evidence (E5) as independent from the 
government informants’ statements about the equity appeal (E2)—another assumption that we 
made when assigning likelihoods in the first ordering—then the denominator on the left-hand 
side of (4) becomes: P(E5 |H E6 E1-4) = P(E5 |H E6 E1 E3-4) = P(E5ʹ′|H Eʹ′1-4), where we have 
relabeled the pieces of evidence according to the second (primed) ordering scheme.  Equation 
(A3.5) can then be rewritten as: 
 𝑃 𝐸6     𝐻  𝐸1–5)𝑃 𝐸5′     𝐻  𝐸′1–4) = 𝑃 𝐸1′   𝐻)  𝑃 𝐸5  |  𝐻  𝐸1–4     .                                                                                                                                                                                                                              (𝐴3.6)  
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Both the left-hand side and the right-hand side of (A3.6) can be calculated directly from our 
likelihood assignments.  For each hypothesis, the equation is satisfied.  For example, for HEA we 
have 0.05/0.15 = 0.33 = 0.001/0.003.   
Of course, the assumptions we have made about independence probably do not hold 
exactly.  E5 and E2, for example, may well have some dependence.  If the equity appeal 
hypothesis is false, one could imagine mechanisms through which the political elite might 
nevertheless converge on a common perception of the equity appeal’s importance.  If HEA is 
correct, it could be the case that sources in E5 learned about the equity appeal’s effect in part 
from the sources in E2, or vice versa.  Any dependence is probably small, however.  Under HEA, 
there are many ways that informants could learn about the equity appeal’s importance, while 
under ~HEA, informants might still independently jump to the reasonable albeit incorrect 
conclusions expressed in E2 and E5 (see similar discussion regarding E2 and E4 in Section A3.3).  
We stress again that it can be very difficult to assess logical and causal dependencies in 
qualitative data given the multiple and complex ways in which such dependencies could arise.   
We proceed to calculate posterior probabilities on the four hypotheses by applying the 
Bayesian formula (A3.2) as before.  The new sequencing produces posteriors that are essentially 
identical to those calculated with the original ordering, although as discussed previously, this 
consistency was achieved only after extensive deliberation and iterative adjustments of the 
likelihoods across the two sequencings.  The charts below show how our degree of belief in each 
hypothesis changes after incorporating each piece of evidence following the new sequencing; for 
comparison we reproduce the charts corresponding to the first ordering of evidence as well 
(Figure A3.3).  In the first and second scenarios (equal priors and median-voter irrelevance 
priors), the first piece of evidence alone—the right party deputy’s candid statement—boosts our 
confidence in HEA above 99%.  In the skeptical reviewer scenario, this second ordering of the 
evidence establishes HEA as the leading explanation more quickly than the first sequencing—we 
reach 84% confidence in the equity appeal hypothesis after incorporating just the first three 
pieces of evidence.  It is interesting to note that the probability on HMV increases as the first two 
pieces of evidence are taken into account, reaching 99%.  This result arises because HEA starts 
out with such a low prior, HMV fits best with E1ʹ′ and E2ʹ′ among the three initially much more 
likely hypotheses, and we have assumed that one of the four hypotheses is correct.  However, the 
very low likelihood of observing E3ʹ′—right party resistance to eliminating 57 bis in the past—
under HMV relative to HEA establishes the equity appeal hypothesis as the leading explanation.   
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Figure A3.3: Probabilities of Hypotheses After Incorporating Evidence:  
Eʹ′1–Eʹ′6 (left panels) vs. E1–E-6 (right panels) 
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A3.6 Responding to Skeptics: Bayesian Sensitivity Analysis 
We now assess the reviewer’s critique of the 2005 reform case study. The original case 
narrative included E1, E2, E5 and E6.  Starting from the Scenario 3 priors, we reach 99.4% 
confidence in HEA after incorporating these four pieces of evidence;32 the leading alternative 
hypothesis in this scenario, HP, is 23 dB less likely than HEA.  For the reviewer to sustain the 
position that the case study does not include sufficient evidence to substantiate the equity-appeal 
explanation, the relative prior odds against HEA would have to be even lower than we have 
assumed for this exercise.33  A prior probability of 10–8 on HEA, corresponding to relative log-
odds against the hypothesis of 72 dB, would leave the equity appeal hypothesis as likely as the 
preferences hypothesis (but still 28 dB more likely than the institutional hypothesis and 17 dB 
more likely than the median voter hypothesis) in light of the four pieces of evidence.  Once we 
bring in E3 and E4, which Fairfield (2013) included in the process tracing appendix to further 
substantiate the equity appeal argument, an extremely small prior probability of 10–12 on HEA 
would be needed to leave the posterior probability on HEA similar to the posterior probability on 
the leading alternative (now HMV).34  The initial relative log-odds against HEA would be 115 dB, 
which is extremely large—roughly corresponding to the noise level of a live rock concert.  In 
other words, the reviewer would have to feel that his/her background information is “screaming” 
against HEA. 
Of course, a skeptic might contest the likelihood ratios we have assigned for the evidence.  
However, there are six orders of magnitude to contend with before HEA can be called into 
question in favor of a rival hypothesis.  Table A3.4 shows the relative prior odds against HEA that 
would leave the equity appeal hypothesis as likely as the leading rival hypothesis for three 
scenarios in which we compress the likelihood ratios of our evidence.  In scenario (a) we 
arbitrarily reduce the likelihood ratios for E1 and E3 through E6 by a factor of ten.35  For E2, we 
set the likelihood under each alternative hypothesis to half the likelihood under HEA to represent 
a lower degree of confidence in the government informants’ judgment and sincerity and hence a 
higher probability of hearing them declare that the equity appeal mattered if HEA is not correct.  
The changes introduced in this scenario decrease the relative prior odds against HEA needed for 
parity with HMV (the leading rival) in light of the evidence from 115 dB to 68 dB.  In scenario (b) 
we compress the likelihood ratios for E1 and E3 through E6 by another factor of five.  This 
scenario reduces the relative prior odds against HEA required for equivalence with HMV to slightly 
over 40 dB.  However, in scenario (c) where we simultaneously lower the prior on HMV to 0.1% 
while keeping the priors on HI and HP equal, the posterior probability on HEA remains higher than 
the rivals until the relative prior odds against HEA compared to HP increase to 58 dB.    
  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32Since we judge E5 and E6 to be essentially independent of E3 and E4, we can proceed using the likelihoods 
previously assigned.   
33Assuming the likelihood ratios remain unaltered.      
34A prior-independent way to assess the leverage gained by including E3 and E4 is to examine the added weight of 
evidence in favor of HEA: 56 dB relative to HI, 60 dB relative to HP, and 26 dB relative to HMV.  These numbers can 
be obtained by adding the weights of evidence displayed for E3 and E4 in Figure A3.1.  
35In this and the following scenarios we leave the small likelihood ratio for E1 under HEA vs. HP unchanged.  
Fairfield and Charman V.2.3 
	   64 
Table A3.4: Required Prior Odds against HEA (dB) Relative to Most Likely Alternative 
 Likelihood ratios (E1–E5) reduced by: 
In order to achieve: a) Factor of 10*  b) Factor of 50** 
Equal priors on HI, HP, and HMV   c) Equal priors on HI, HP; HMV prior =0.1% 
Posterior parity with leading 
rival hypothesis 
–68 (noisy 
restaurant) 
 –40.5  –58  
Relative posterior odds of 10 
dB in favor of HEA 
–58 (typical 
conversation) 
 –30.5 (watch 
ticking) 
 –48                                                  
(rainstorm) 
*Reduces weight of evidence by 10 dB 
**Reduces weight of evidence by 17 dB 
 
 
In sum, to maintain that the case study does not include sufficient evidence to substantiate 
HEA—operationalized as at least 10 dB in favor of HEA relative to the leading alternative—a 
reader must have an extremely high prior bias against the equity appeal hypothesis and 
substantial confidence in the median voter hypothesis and/or maintain that the evidence is far 
less discriminating (in terms of likelihood ratios) than we have argued.   
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A4. Case Narrative: Chile’s 2005 Tax Reform 
Excerpt from Fairfield (2013: 47-49) 
 
Business’s strong political power made it difficult for Chile’s center-left governments to 
legislate tax increases in the 1990s and 2000s. Business power arose primarily from organization 
and partisan ties (Fairfield, 2010). Chile’s prestigious economy-wide business association, the 
CPC, coordinated lobbying across sectors on sensitive issues like taxation, which business often 
portrayed as confiscation of property. Further, business was a core constituency for the two right 
parties, especially the UDI. The UDI’s neoliberal, low-tax policy positions drew electoral and 
financial support from business owners (Luna, 2010). The UDI and dominant business groups 
were also linked through common origins in the Pinochet dictatorship; government technocrats 
who later joined the UDI were often board members of business groups that benefited from 
privatization (Schamis, 1999; Silva, 1996). The right, which was essentially tied with the center-
left in the senate during Lagos’ administration (2000–05), often took instruction on tax policy 
directly from business, and business and the right mounted coordinated opposition (interviews: 
Finance Ministry-a, 2007; Tax Agency, 2005). Increasing taxes therefore en- tailed costly 
political battles. 
When center-left governments sought to increase the low direct tax burden born by 
economic elites, they employed multiple strategies, among which equity appeals were often 
prominent. Equity appeals created political space for incremental advances despite strong 
business power. As the two cases illustrate, equity appeals undermined business-right opposition 
more effectively during electoral periods, particularly when inequality became a salient 
campaign issue. 
… 
Legitimating appeals helped the government legislate another income-tax base-broadening 
measure in 2005. Given the unusually high salience of inequality during a presidential campaign, 
vertical equity appeals generated much stronger electoral incentives for the right to deviate from 
its core business constituency’s preferences. 
The tax benefit known as “57 bis,” inherited from the dictatorship, constituted a perpetual 
government subsidy for owners of new-issue stocks, most of whom belonged to the wealthiest 
percentile of taxpayers. The Lagos administration considered eliminating 57 bis in the Anti-
Evasion reform, but it was judged infeasible given strong business-right resistance (interview, 
Finance Ministry-c, 2005). Efforts to eliminate the exemption in the 1990s also failed. 
An opportunity for reform arose in 2005 due to unanticipated electoral competition from 
the right on the issue of inequality. When Chile’s Catholic bishops forcefully denounced the 
country’s persistent inequality, right-coalition presidential candidate Lavín blamed lack of 
progress on the center-left: “Inequality, Mr. President, continues. ...There is a Chile that grows, 
but it is for the few, and the great majority have not yet benefited,” (El Mercurio, 2005a). 
Inequality became the central campaign issue during the following weeks. President Lagos 
responded with a challenge: “The infamous article 57 bis represents a tremendous support for 
inequality. . . Instead of just talking, why don’t we agree to eliminate 57 bis in less than 24 
hours?” (El Mercurio, 2005b). 
This vertical equity appeal proved highly successful. In contrast to the Anti-Evasion 
reform, debate on 57 bis was minimal. Lavín accepted the government’s challenge: “…we are all 
for equity. Let’s do it,” (El Mercurio, 2005c), and right legislators followed his lead, 
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disregarding business’s policy preferences. The bill received nearly unanimous congressional 
approval. 
The salience of inequality during the campaign raised the anticipated political costs to the 
right of defending business interests. Opposing the reform would have undermined Lavín’s 
credibility and validated the government’s claim that the right was the main obstacle to reducing 
inequality in Chile. With only six months until the election and public attention focused on 
inequality, voters might well have remembered the coalition’s policy position and punished 
Lavín at the polls.  Lavín ’s advisors attributed Lagos’ narrow 1999 victory to the right’s 
rejection of a popular labor-rights bill sent to congress during the campaign; this episode 
weighed heavily in the right’s analysis of the 2005 reform (El Mercurio, 2005d, 2005e). 
Comparing the two reforms, a Lavín advisor declared: “The center-right is not willing to fall into 
the 1999 trap again,” (El Mercurio, 2005e). Meanwhile, framing the tax in- crease as hurting the 
middle class, a tactic regularly used by the right, was not feasible because the reform patently 
targeted elites. Tax agency data showed that 0.5% of adults received 72% of the tax expenditure 
associated with 57 bis. As a government informant recalled: “it was a pure transfer of resources 
to rich people; there was no way to argue differently.  …It was not possible for the right to 
oppose the reform after making that argument about inequality,” (interview, Finance Ministry-b, 
2005). An UDI (interview, 2005) informant candidly acknowledged that electoral concerns 
motivated the right to accept the reform: “the opposition demonstrated that this time it would 
accept things that usually it was not disposed to accept so as not to harm the presidential 
option—in this case it would do something popular, perhaps populist.” The counterfactual 
therefore seems clear: had the government attempted to eliminate 57 bis without the high-profile 
equity appeal, the right would have blocked the reform as it had on multiple prior occasions. 
 
 
 
